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Abstract
A pillage game is a coalitional game that is meant to be a model of Hobbesian
anarchy. The spatial pillage game introduces a spatial feature into the pillage
game by assuming that players are located in regions. Players can travel from
one region to another in one move and can form a coalition and combine their
power only with players in the same region. A coalition has power only within
its region. Under this spatial restriction, some members of a coalition can
pillage less powerful coalitions without any cost. The feasibility of pillages
between coalitions determines the dominance relation. Core, stable set, and
farsighted core are adopted as alternative solution concepts.
JEL Classication Numbers: C71, D74, R19
Keywords: allocation by force, coalitional games, pillage game, spatial re-
striction, stable set, farsighted core
1 Introduction
Hobbesian anarchy is a state of society before a government ensuring property rights
is organized. Without such an organization, no individuals are safe to secure their
wealth. Individuals could be tempted to pillage others whenever possible and bene-
cial. Although a coalition could be formed to secure their wealth, some members of
the coalition may still be tempted to betray the others and to take their wealth. Con-
sequently, in Hobbesian anarchy, the possibility of the stable distribution of wealth
is questionable.
A substantial amount of literature on allocation by force has been devoted to
this possibility. Skaperdas (1992) showed that a cooperative outcome is possible
in equilibrium if the probability of winning in conict is su¢ ciently robust against
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1
each individuals action. Hirshleifer (1995) found the conditions to make Hobbesian
anarchy stable. Also, Hirshleifer (1991), Konrad and Skaperdas (1998), and Muthoo
(1991) studied the situations in which property right is partially secured. These
studies analyzed noncooperative models in which the formation of coalitions is limited
or not allowed.
Di¤erent from the previous models, Piccione and Rubinstein (2006) and Jordan
(2005) developed models of Hobbesian anarchy that allow the formation of coalitions.
Piccione and Rubinstein introduced the jungle in which coercion governs economic
transactions and they compared the equilibrium allocation of the jungle with the
equilibrium allocation of an exchange economy. Jordan introduced pillage games
and examined stable sets of allocations in which the power of pillaging balances
endogenously.
The spatial pillage game is an extended version of a pillage game. In most literature
on "allocation by force" including the papers reviewed above, there is no restriction
on using power. Thus any individual or coalitions can pillage another individual or
other coalitions if one is more powerful than others. However, the acts of pillaging
and defending are inevitably under spatial restriction. Members of a coalition, if they
move together, cannot simultaneously pillage two less powerful coalitions that are far
apart from each other. Likewise, two coalitions cannot combine their power to defend
themselves together against another powerful coalition unless they are close enough
to each other. The spatial pillage game introduces a space concept, which conditions
power usage based on location, into a Hobbesian anarchy model that allows the
formation of coalitions, in the hope of understanding how spatial restriction a¤ects
stable distributions of wealth.
The assumptions about the space concept are as follows. There are regions and
each player can stay in only one of the regions. Players can change their regions
to pillage others. The regions are connected with one another, and thus players
can travel from a region to another in one move. Players can form a coalition and
combine their power only after getting together in a common region. If coalitions are
in di¤erent regions, they cannot combine their power. The inuence of the power of
each coalition is limited within its region. Therefore, a coalition cannot pillage two
other coalitions in di¤erent regions simultaneously.
The other assumptions of the spatial pillage game are the same as the original
pillage games. A xed amount of wealth is allocated among a nite number of players.
Some players can form a coalition under the spatial restriction. A coalition can pillage
less powerful coalitions within its region without any cost. An increase in the wealth
of a coalition causes an increase in its power. Since the power of each coalition
is endogenously determined, the spatial pillage game cannot have a characteristic
function, which exogenously determines the power of each coalition.
The pillage games are characterized by power functions that determine the feasi-
bility of pillages between coalitions. Jordan presented three power functions classied
by the degree of their dependence on the sizes of coalitions. Wealth is power is one
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of the power functions and species the power of each coalition as its total wealth.
Therefore, "wealth is power" is characterized as independent of the sizes of coali-
tions. Only the pillage game with this function has a stable set in every possible case.
Therefore, the spatial pillage game adopts "wealth is power" as a power function.
As criteria for stable distributions of wealth and players, three solution concepts
are explored, i.e., core, stable set, and farsighted core. First, the core is the collection
of states at which pillage is not possible, thus it is one of the most persuasive solution
concepts. However, because of its strong requirement, the core is too small to rep-
resent stable situations as shown in Theorem 6. Second, a stable set is much bigger
than the core if it exists, as shown in Theorem 21. A stable set is a collection of
states that is both internally stable and externally stable. Internal stability requires
that pillage not be possible between states in the collection and external stability
requires that pillage at a state outside the collection result in another state inside the
collection. In most cases, however, there are no stable set. And even when they exist,
they contain implausible states as shown in Theorems 21 and 28. Third, farsighted
core, which was introduced by Jordan (2005), solves these problems in stable sets,
as shown in Theorem 33 and Lemma 34. A farsighted core is a collection of states
at which pillage in expectation is not possible in the sense that some members of
the pillage would end up being worse o¤, and consequently they would not join the
pillage.
In section 2, we search for the core and stable sets. First, the core is characterized.
Then, since one-player models and two-player models are trivial, we start from three-
player models and completely characterize stable sets in those models. Finally, we
show that no stable set exists in a I player and N region model where I = 4 and
N = 2 or I  4 and N  3. In section 3, we construct a consistent expectation,
dened in Denition 31, to nd a farsighted core. After conrming the existence
of a farsighted core in a consistent expectation, we explore one of the properties
that farsighted cores of consistent expectations have in common. Then, we show
that in a I player and N region model where 1  I  3 or N = 1, there is the
unique farsighted core of consistent expectations. In section 4, a suggestion for further
research is presented.
2 Core and stable set
The environment of a spatial pillage game is dened in Denitions 1 and 2. We
normalize the total wealth to unity. Note that denitions in this section are applied
throughout the whole paper.
Denition 1 1The nite set I is the set of players. A coalition is a subset of
I. The set A = fw 2 RI : wi  0 for all i 2 I and
P
z2I wz = 1g is the set of
allocations.
1We follow notations in Jordan (2005).
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The denitions below concern the spatial environment.
Denition 2 The nite set R is the set of regions and the Cartesian product RI is
the set of distributions. Given a distribution p 2 RI , the coalition pr = fi 2 I :
pi = rg is the population at region r.
A distribution is short for a population distribution and denotes how players are
distributed over the regions. For example, the distribution p = (1; 1; 2) expresses that
players 1 and 2 are at region 1 and player 3 is at region 2. Also, it means p1 = f1; 2g
and p2 = f3g.
A state denotes both the allocation and distribution of the status quo.
Denition 3 The Cartesian product X = ARI is the set of states.
For instance, the ordered pair (w; p) = ((1
2
; 1
4
; 1
4
); (1; 1; 2)) is a state in the three-
player and two-region model. The state (w; p) expresses that player 1 has 1
2
and
player 2 has 1
4
while staying at region 1 and player 3 has 1
4
while staying at region 2.
The dominance relation between states is dened as follows.
Denition 4 Given states (w; p) and (w0; p0), dene W = fi : w0i > wig and L =
fi : w0i < wig. Suppose for some r; q 2 R, i) fi : w0i 6= wig  p0r; ii) fi : pi 6= p0ig = ?
or fi : pi 6= p0ig = W  pq; and iii)
P
i2W wi >
P
i2Lwi. Then (w
0; p0) dominates
(w; p).
The dominance relation shows which state the status quo can move to. It must
satisfy both physical and spatial conditions. The physical condition requires that
the winning coalition W must have enough power to pillage the losing coalition L.
Denition 4 presents this condition at iii). Jordan (2005) introduced a variety of
physical conditions. The condition iii) above accords with the physical condition of
the wealth is power in Jordan (2005). The spatial condition requires that the act
of pillaging must satisfy spatial restriction. This condition is expressed at i) and
ii) in Denition 4. The condition i) means that transfers of wealth happen only in
destination region r where the pillage happens. The condition ii) denotes that only
the winners can travel and that they are all from the common region q.
In this section, we adopt the solution concepts of core and stable set. The
denition stated below follows Lucas (1992) and Jordan (2005).
Denition 5 The set of undominated states is the core C. For any set E of states,
let the set U(E) be the set of states that are not dominated by any state in E. A set S
of states is a stable set if it satises both S  U(S), which means internal stability,
and S  U(S), which means external stability.
Therefore, a stable set S is dened by the set of states that satises S = U(S).
Theorem 6 embodies the core. Note that this result is applied throughout section
2.
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Theorem 6 The set f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or 0g is the
core C.
Proof. Suppose (w; p) 2 f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or 0g. If
wi > 0, then wi  minf12 ; 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0gg. If
1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g 
1
2
, then #fr 2 R :
j2prwj > 0g = 1 or 2 and thus for each i, wi = 1; 12 ; or 0. In this case, any coalition
W cannot pillage another coalition L such that W \ L = ? because if Pi2Lwi > 0,
then
P
i2Lwi  12 and so 12 
P
i=2Lwi 
P
i2W wi. If
1
2
> 1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g , then
#fi : wi > 0g = #fr 2 R : j2prwj > 0g since #fi : wi > 0g  #fr 2 R : j2prwj >
0g and #fi : wi > 0g 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g = #fi : wi > 0gminf
1
2
; 1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0gg 
i2Iwi = 1, and thus for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g or 0 since wi 
1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g
or 0. In this case, we have for each r 2 R, j2prwj = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g or 0, and so
any coalition W such that W  pq for some q 2 R cannot pillage another coalition
L such that W \ L = ? because if Pi2Lwi > 0, then Pi2Lwi  1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g
and 1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g 
P
i2W wi. Therefore, (w; p) is not dominated. Since (w; p) is
arbitrary, every state in the set f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or
0g is not dominated.
Suppose (w; p) =2 f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or 0g. Then
there exists i such that wi =2 f0; 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; 1g. If wi > 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ,
then there exists q 2 R such that 1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g > j2pqwj > 0 since j2Iwj = 1,
and thus player i can pillage another player j such that wj > 0 and pj = q since
wi >
1
#fr2R:j2prwj>0g > k2pqwk  wj > 0. If #fr 2 R : j2prwj > 0g = 1
and wi < 1, then either 1 > wi > 12 or
1
2
> wi > 0 since wi =2 f12 ; 0g, and thus
player i can pillage player j such that wj > 0 or the coalition W = fk : k 6= i and
pk = pig can pillage player i. If #fr 2 R : j2prwj > 0g  2 and 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g >
wi, then
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig , which denotes the average wealth of regions ex-
cept the region pi, is well dened, and thus either wi  j =2ppiwj#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig
or
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig > wi. If wi 
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig , then j2ppiwj >
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig , which means that the wealth of the region pi is greater than
the average wealth of regions except the region pi, since 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g > wi 
j =2ppiwj
#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig , and thus all players in the region pi can pillage another re-
gion q such that wi  j2pqwj > 0. If j =2ppiwj#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig > wi, then all players
in q such that j2pqwj  j =2ppiwj#fr2R:j2prwj>0 and r 6=pig can pillage the player i. This means
that (w; p) is dominated by some state in X. Since (w; p) is arbitrary, every state in
X n f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, wi = 1#fr2R:j2prwj>0g ;
1
2
; or 0g is dominated.
5
2.1 Stable set in three-player models
To characterize stable sets, we divide states into four groups according to their dis-
tributions and allocations; group 1) all players are in one region; group 2) players
have less than halves and occupy two regions; group 3) only one player has a half or
more and the player stays alone in his region; and group 4) only one player has a half
or more and the player is together with only another player in his region. It is easy
to analyze the states in groups 1), 2), and 3) to nd a stable set, it is not in group
4), however. Thus we would devote most this subsection to analyzing the states in
group 4). For simplicity of expression, we call a state in group 4) a basic state and a
set of basic states a basic set. Note that denitions and results in this subsection are
applied to subsection 2.2 as well as subsection 2.1.
Denition 7 formalizes a basic set and a basic state.
Denition 7 For any three distinct players i; j; and k, dene the set B(i; j; k) of
distributions by B(i; j; k) = fp 2 RI : for some region r 2 R, pr = fi; jg or fi; kg g
and dene the correspondence Bij;k : [
1
2
; 1]  RI  ! ! X by Bij;k(a; _p) = f(w; p) 2
X : p = _p, wi  a, and wi + wj + wk = 1g. For each p 2 B(i; j; k), the set Bij;k(12 ; p)
of states is called a basic set. A state in a basic set is called a basic state.
The set B(i; j; k) denotes the set of distributions such that either player i and
player j, or player i and player k constitute all population in some region. For
example, let p = (1; 1; 2) and p0 = (1; 2; 1), then p; p0 2 B(1; 2; 3) because player 1
shares region 1 only with player 2 at the distribution p and only with player 3 at the
distribution p0. The basic sets are visualized on the hyperplane of states in Figure
1. The black area and the gray area denote the basic set B12;3(
1
2
; (1; 1; 2)) and the
basic set B21;3(
1
2
; (1; 1; 2)), respectively. They are all possible basic sets under the
distribution (1; 1; 2).
In Figure 1, consider the basic state (w; p) = (( 7
12
; 3
12
; 1
6
); (1; 1; 2)) where players 1
has 7
12
and player 2 has 3
12
while staying at region 1 and player 3 has 1
6
while staying
at region 2. Note that player 1 cannot pillage players 2 and 3 simultaneously because
players 2 and 3 are in di¤erent regions. If player 1 pillages player 3 at (w; p), then the
allocation of the state is located on the left arrow in the gure, and the distribution
changes from (1; 1; 2) to (2; 1; 2). If player 1 pillages player 2 at (w; p), then the state
is located on the right arrow, and the distribution does not change.
For notational simplicity, we dene the following set of states.
Denition 8 For any three distinct players i; j; and k, dene the correspondence
H ij;k : [
1
2
; 1]  RI  ! ! X by H ij;k(a; _p) = f(w; p) 2 X : p = _p, wi = a, and
wi + wj + wk = 1g.
For each (a; p) 2 [1
2
; 1]RI , the setH ij;k(a; p) consists of the states such that wi = a
in Bij;k(
1
2
; p). In Figure 2, the bold horizontal line and the dot denote H ij;k(
7
12
; (1; 1; 2))
and w = ( 7
12
; 3
12
; 1
6
), respectively.
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Figure 1: Basic Sets
Figure 2: The Set H12;3(
7
12
; (1; 1; 2))
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Denition 9 introduces the condition that a stable set has to satisfy. The condition
is related to basic sets, and thus we call this condition the basic condition. If a
set S 0 of states lacks the basic condition, then S 0 cannot satisfy internal stability and
external stability simultaneously.
Denition 9 Given a set E of states, for any two distinct states (w; p); ( _w; p) 2 E \
Bij;k(
1
2
; p) such that p 2 B(i; j; k) and 1 > _wi  wi > 12 , suppose that i) 0 < _wj  wj
and 0 < _wk  wk; and ii) _wk < wk when pi = pj and _wj < wj when pi = pk. Then
the set E of states is said to satisfy the basic condition.
We can prove that a stable set satises the basic condition by way of contradiction.
That is, if we assume that there is a stable set that lacks the basic condition, then
we can show that the stable set cannot satisfy external stability and internal stability
simultaneously.
Lemma 10 A stable set satises the basic condition.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a stable set S that does
not satises the basic condition. Then for some three distinct players i; j; and k,
there exist two distinct states (w; p); ( _w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p) such that p 2 B(i; j; k);
1 > _wi  wi > 12 ; if pi = pk, then _wk > wk or _wj  wj; and if pi = pj, then _wk  wk
or _wj > wj. Without loss of generality, we can assume that player i is together with
player j in a common region, i.e., pi = pj. Then we must have that either _wk  wk
or _wj > wj. We can show that in each case, S cannot satisfy internal stability and
external stability simultaneously.
Suppose that we have that _wk  wk. We rst show that _wk > wk. Every state
( w; p) in Bij;k(
1
2
; p) such that wk = wk and wi = wi has wj = wj since wi + wj + wk =
wi + wj + wk = 1. Thus we have that ( w; p) = (w; p). Therefore, ( _w; p) cannot have
_wk = wk and _wi = wi since (w; p) 6= ( _w; p). Every state (...w; p) in Bij;k(12 ; p) such that...
wk = wk and
...
wi > wi is the state that results from player i pillaging player j at
the state (w; p); that is, such state (
...
w; p) dominates (w; p). By internal stability, S
cannot contain such state (
...
w; p) and thus ( _w; p) cannot be _wk = wk and _wi > wi.
Therefore, we must have that _wk 6= wk and thus that _wk > wk.
Let the allocation w0 be w0j = _wj, w
0
k = wk, and w
0
i = 1   _wj   wk. Since
_wi  wi and _wk > wk, we have wj = 1   wi   wk > 1   _wi   _wk = _wj. Thus
we have w0i = 1   _wj   wk > 1   wj   wk = wi. Since w0k = wk, w0i > wi, and
w0j = _wj = 1 wk w0i = wj  (w0i wi), (w0; p) dominates (w; p) by player i pillaging
player j. Thus S cannot contain (w0; p) according to internal stability. To satisfy
external stability, S has to dominate (w0; p).
However, we can show that S cannot dominate (w0; p). The stable set S can
dominate (w0; p), only if S contains those states as follows; the states that result from
player i pillaging player j at (w0; p), the states that result from player i pillaging
player k at (w0; p), the states that result from players i and j pillaging player k at
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(w0; p), the states that result from player j pillaging player k at (w0; p) when w0j > w
0
k,
or the states that result from player k pillaging player j at (w0; p) when w0k > w
0
j.
Note that player j and player k are in di¤erent regions and so player i cannot pillage
both of them simultaneously although player i has enough power to do it, i.e., pj 6= pk
and w0i > w
0
j + w
0
k. We will show that S cannot contain any state above.
Every state that results from player i pillaging player j at (w0; p) dominates (w; p),
which is in S according to our assumption. By internal stability, S cannot contain
those states. Every state that results from player i pillaging player k at (w0; p) domi-
nates ( _w; p), which is in S according to our assumption. Similarly, S cannot contain
those states. The states that result from players i and j pillaging player k at (w0; p)
are all dominated by ((0; :::; wi = 1; :::; 0); (pk; :::; pk)), which is in the core. Thus S
cannot contain those states. The states that result from player j pillaging player k
at (w0; p) or that result from player k pillaging player j at (w0; p) are all dominated
by either ((0; :::; wi = 1; :::; 0); (pk; :::; pk)) or ((0; :::; wi = 1; :::; 0); (pj; :::; pj)). Thus S
cannot contain those states. Therefore, S cannot dominate (w0; p) and thus cannot
satisfy external stability. This contradiction shows that _wk  wk is not possible.
Suppose that we have that _wj > wj. Then we can similarly show that S cannot
dominate the state (w00; p) such that w00j = wj, w
00
k = _wk, and w
00
i = 1   wj   _wk.
Consequently, the stable set S cannot satisfy internal stability and external stability
simultaneously. This contradiction completes the proof.
Lemma 11 presents another condition that a stable set must follow. Lemma 10
examines the relation between two basic states in a stable set. Lemma 11 examines
the relation between a basic state and another state whose distribution results from
the move of the player who has a half or more at the basic state.
Lemma 11 Suppose that p 2 B(i; j; k) and (w; p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; p). Let a distribution
_p satisfy that _pz = pz for each z 6= i and _pi 2 fpj; pkg. Given a stable set S, if
(w; _p) 2 S, then (w; p) 2 S.
Proof. If _pi = pi 2 fpj; pkg, then _p = p, and thus this result obviously follows. Now,
we have to show that if _pi 6= pi and (w; _p) 2 S, then (w; p) 2 S. Suppose by way of
contradiction that _pi 6= pi and (w; _p) 2 S, but (w; p) =2 S. It su¢ ces to show that S
cannot contain any state that dominates (w; p).
Without loss of generality, we assume that wj  wk. Since (w; _p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; _p),
we have that wi  12 and wi + wj + wk = 1. We rst show that if wj > wk then
wj+wk <
1
2
. By way of contradiction, suppose not, that is, wj > wk and wj+wk = 12 .
Then (w; _p) is dominated by the state ( w; p) such that wi = wj = 12 , which is in the
core, C, by player j pillaging all wealth of player k at (w; _p). This contradicts internal
stability of S since (w; _p) 2 S and C  S.
Let (w0; p0) result from player j or players i and j pillaging player k at (w; p).
Then we have p0j = p
0
k. If players i and j pillage player k at (w; _p), then w
0
i > wi  12
and w0j > 0, and thus player i can deprive the other players of their all wealth by
pillage since p0j = p
0
k and w
0
j + w
0
k < w
0
i. If player j alone pillages player k at (w; _p),
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then wj > wk and thus w0i = wi >
1
2
since wj+wk < 12 . Thus player i can also deprive
the other players of their all wealth in one move since p0j = p
0
k and w
0
j + w
0
k < w
0
i.
Therefore, (w0; p0) is dominated by some state ( _w0; _p0) in the core such that _w0i = 1,
and thus S cannot contain (w0; p0). Similarly, we can show that S cannot contain any
state that results from players i and k pillaging player j at (w; p).
Let (w00; p00) result from player i pillaging player j at (w; p). Then we have that
w00i > wi, w
00
j < wj, and w
00
z = wz for each z 2 I n fi; jg. Note that fz : p00z 6= pzg  fig
and thus fz : p00z 6= _pzg  fig since _pz = pz for each z 6= i. Therefore, (w00; p00)
dominates (w; _p) by player i pillaging player j. Thus S cannot contain (w00; p00).
Similarly, we can show that S cannot contain any state that results from player i
pillaging player k at (w; p).
Consequently, S cannot contain any state that dominates ( _w; p) and thus cannot
satisfy external stability. This contradiction completes the proof.
Lemma 12 shows another implication of Lemma 10 and Lemma 11. We will
express basic states in a stable set with a function. Lemma 12 provides a basis to
dene the function that characterizes a stable set.
Lemma 12 Given a stable set S, S \ H ij;k(a; p) has a single element for each 1 
a > 1
2
and p 2 B(i; j; k).
Proof. It su¢ ces to show that for each 1 > a > 1
2
and p 2 B(i; j; k), S \H ij;k(a; p)
has a single element because H ij;k(1; p) has only one state regardless of p, which is
in the core and so in a stable set. Suppose that (w0; p); (w; p) 2 S \ H ij;k(a; p) such
that 1 > a > 1
2
and p 2 B(i; j; k). Then we have that (w0; p); (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)
and 1 > w0i = wi >
1
2
. Suppose by way of contradiction that w0 6= w. By the basic
condition of S, we have that either w0j  wj and w0k < wk, or w0j < wj and w0k  wk
since 1 > w0i  wi > 12 . However, neither case is possible since w0i + w0j + w0k =
wi + wj + wk. Therefore, we must have that w0 = w, and thus S \H ij;k(a; p) has at
most one state for each 1 > a > 1
2
and p 2 B(i; j; k).
We need to show that S \H ij;k(a; p) 6= ? for each 1 > a > 12 and p 2 B(i; j; k) to
complete the proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a stable set S
such that S \H ij;k(a; p) = ? for some 1 > a > 12 and p 2 B(i; j; k). Without loss of
generality, we can assume that player i is together with player j in a common region,
i.e., pi = pj. Let wj = supfwj : (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(a; p)g and wk = supfwk : (w; p) 2
S \Bij;k(a; p)g.
We rst show that a + wj + wk  1. Suppose by way of contradiction that
a + wj + wk > 1. Then by the denitions of wj and wk, there exist states ( _w; p)
and ( w; p) such that ( _w; p); ( w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(a; p) and a + _wj + wk > 1. Since
( _w; p); ( w; p) 2 Bij;k(a; p), we have that _wi; wi  a and thus that _wi + _wj + wk > 1
and wi+ _wj + wk > 1. Thus we have that _wj > wj and _wk < wk since _wi+ _wj + _wk =
wi + wj + wk = 1. However, the basic condition of S implies that both _wj  wj and
_wk  wk if _wi  wi and both _wj  wj and _wk  wk if _wi  wi. This contradiction
guarantees that a+ wj + wk  1.
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Dene the allocation w to be wi = a, wj = wj +
1 (a+ wj+ wk)
2
, and wk = wk +
1 (a+ wj+ wk)
2
. Then S cannot contain (w; p) since (w; p) 2 H ij;k(a; p) and S\H ij;k(a; p) =
?. To prove that the assertion, S \H ij;k(a; p) = ?, is impossible, it su¢ ces to show
that S cannot dominate (w; p).
First, we show that every state that results from player i pillaging player j at
(w; p) cannot be in S. Let the state (w0; p) result from player i pillaging player j
at (w; p). Then we have that w0i > a, w
0
j < wj, w
0
k = wk, and (w
0; p) 2 Bij;k(a; p);
that is, player i increases its wealth through pillaging player j at the state (w; p) and
player k maintains its wealth because the pillage does not a¤ect player k0s wealth. If
1 > ( wj + wk+ a) then w0k > wk, and thus (w
0; p) =2 S because wk is the supremum of
the wealth that player k can have at states in S \ Bij;k(a; p) and (w0; p) 2 Bij;k(a; p).
If 1 = wj + wk + a, then w0j < wj = wj and w
0
k = wk = wk. Thus there exists a state
(w00; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(a; p) such that w0j < w00j  wj and w00k  wk by the denitions of
wj and wk. Thus if (w0; p) 2 S, then the basic condition of S means that w00i < w0i
since w0j < w
00
j and so that w
0
k < w
00
k . Since w
00
k  wk = w0k, we have that (w0; p) =2 S.
Note that (w0; p) is arbitrary such that (w0; p) results from player i pillaging player j
at (w; p). Therefore, S cannot contain the states that result from player i pillaging
player j at (w; p).
Second, we prove that every state that results from player i pillaging player k
at (w; p) cannot be in S. Suppose by way of contradiction that S contains a state
(w000; p0) that results from player i pillaging player k at (w; p). Then we have that
w000i > wi, w
000
k < wk, and w
000
j = wj. Consider the state (w
000; p). Then we have
that p 2 B(i; j; k) and p0z = pz for each z 6= i and p0i = pk. Lemma 11 means that
(w000; p) 2 S \Bij;k(a; p) since (w000; p0) 2 S. Then we have that wj  w000j according to
the denition of wj. Since w000j = wj = wj +
1 (a+ wj+ wk)
2
 wj, we have that w000j = wj
and thus that 1 = a+ wj+ wk. By the denition of wk, there exists (w(4); p) such that
(w(4); p) 2 S \Bij;k(a; p) and w000k < w(4)k < wk = wk. The basic condition of S implies
that w000j  w(4)j since w000k < w(4)k . Since w(4)j  wj = w000j according to the denition
of wj, we have that w000j = w
(4)
j . Therefore, we have that w
000
i > w
(4)
i , w
000
k < w
(4)
k , and
w000j = w
(4)
j . This means that (w
000; p0) dominates (w(4); p) by player i pillaging player k
at (w(4); p). This contradiction assures that (w000; p0) =2 S. Since (w000; p0) is arbitrary,
S cannot contain the states that result from player i pillaging player k at (w; p).
Finally, we demonstrate that every state that dominates (w; p) and that is not
covered by the two cases above is not in S. Note that these states result from either
player j or player k moving to the other regardless of the move of player i. Conse-
quently, player j and player k are in a common region at these states. Therefore, all
such states are dominated by some state in the core such that player i has all of the
wealth because player i, who has a majority of the power, wi  a > 12 , can pillage
both players in one move. Therefore, S cannot contain these states.
Consequently, S cannot dominate (w; p). This means that S cannot satisfy in-
ternal stability and external stability simultaneously. This contradiction guarantees
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that we must have that S \H ij;k(a; p) 6= ? for each 1 > a > 12 and p 2 B(i; j; k).
Denition 13 presents the conditions for the function that characterizes a stable
set and names the function a basic function.
Denition 13 For any three distinct players i; j; and k, let a function ij;k : [0;
1
2
]
B(i; j; k)  ! [0; 1
2
] satisfy that ij;k(; p)   for each (; p) 2 [0; 12 ]  B(i; j; k).
Dene the set B(ij;k) of states by B(
i
j;k) = f(w; p) 2
S
p2B(i;j;k)B
i
j;k(
1
2
; p) : for some
(; p) 2 [0; 1
2
]  B(i; j; k), wj = ij;k(; p) and wk =    ij;k(; p)g. Suppose that
ij;k satises three conditions as follows; i) B(
i
j;k) satises the basic condition; ii) if
p; _p 2 B(i; j; k) satisfy that _pz = pz for each z 6= i and pi 6= _pi, then for each  2 [0; 12 ],
ij;k(; p) = 
i
j;k(; _p); and for each p 2 B(i; j; k), iii) if lim
!1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
, then
ij;k(
1
2
; p) = 1
4
, otherwise ij;k(
1
2
; p) = 1
2
. Then ij;k is called a basic function.
Lemma 14 characterizes the functions that generate the set satisfying the basic
condition.
Lemma 14 Let a function ij;k be a function from [0;
1
2
]  B(i; j; k) to [0; 1
2
] such
that ij;k(; p)   for each (; p) 2 [0; 12 ]  B(i; j; k). If B(ij;k) satises the basic
condition, then ij;k(; p) is uniformly continuous and non-decreasing on [0; 12).
Proof. If B(ij;k) satises the basic condition, then for each
1
2
>  > 0  0 and
p 2 B(i; j; k), we have that   ij;k(; p)  0  ij;k(0; p) and ij;k(; p)  ij;k(0; p).
Therefore, Given any " > 0, we must have that " > ij;k(; p)  ij;k(0; p)  0 for all
; 0 2 [0; 1
2
) and p 2 B(i; j; k) such that " >  0  0. This shows that the function
ij;k(; p) is uniformly continuous and non-decreasing on [0; 12).
Corollary 15 shows properties of a basic function.
Corollary 15 For each p 2 B(i; j; k), a basic function ij;k(; p) : [0; 12 ] ! [0; 12 ] is
uniformly continuous and non-decreasing on [0; 1
2
).
Proof. According to Lemma 14, this result follows.
Lemma 16 strengthens Lemma 10. More concretely, Lemma 16 shows that a
stable set must satisfy three conditions that are reected on a basic function.
Lemma 16 Given a stable set S, for any three distinct players i; j; and k, there
exists a unique basic function ij;k such that (B(
i
j;k)[C)\Bij;k(12 ; p) = S \Bij;k(12 ; p)
for each p 2 B(i; j; k).
Proof. According to Lemma 12, S \ H ij;k(a; p) has a single state for each 1 
a > 1
2
and p 2 B(i; j; k). In addition, we have that S \ H ij;k(12 ; p) 6= ? for each
p 2 B(i; j; k) since such a set contains some states in C, at which two players have
halves. Therefore, we can dene the function  : [1
2
; 1]B(i; j; k)! [0; 1
2
] as follows;
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i) (wi; p) = wj such that (w; p) 2 S\
S
p2B(i;j;k)B
i
j;k(
1
2
; p); and for each p 2 B(i; j; k),
ii) if there exists (w; p) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p) such that wi = 12 and wj = 14 , then (12 ; p) = 14 ,
otherwise (1
2
; p) = 1
2
. That is, the function  assigns each (wi; p) the player j0s
allocation according to (w; p) 2 S \Sp2B(i;j;k)Bij;k(12 ; p).
Dene the function ij;k : [0;
1
2
]  B(i; j; k) ! [0; 1
2
] by ij;k(; p) = (1   ; p).
Then it is easily seen that for each (; p) 2 [0; 1
2
]  B(i; j; k), ij;k(; p)   and
((B(ij;k) [ C) \ Bij;k(12 ; p)) n H ij;k(12 ; p) = (S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)) n H ij;k(12 ; p). Next, we will
show that for each p 2 B(i; j; k), (B(ij;k) [ C) \H ij;k(12 ; p) = S \H ij;k(12 ; p).
By the denition of ij;k, we have that B(
i
j;k)  S and thus that (B(ij;k) [C) \
H ij;k(
1
2
; p)  S\H ij;k(12 ; p) for each p 2 B(i; j; k). Note that if (w0; p) 2 H ij;k(12 ; p) with
w0j =2 f0; 14 ; 12g, then (w0; p) is dominated by some state in C such that two players
have halves. Therefore, if (w; p) 2 S \H ij;k(12 ; p) for some p 2 B(i; j; k), then wj = 0,
1
4
, or 1
2
. And thus (w; p) 2 (B(ij;k) [ C) \ H ij;k(12 ; p) because if wj = 0 or 12 then
(w; p) 2 C and if wj = 14 then (w; p) 2 B(ij;k).
To complete the proof, we must show that the function ij;k is a basic function.
Since (B(ij;k)[C)\Bij;k(12 ; p) = S \Bij;k(12 ; p) for each p 2 B(i; j; k), the set B(ij;k)
satises the basic condition as S does by Lemma 10. If p; _p 2 B(i; j; k) such that
_pz = pz for each z 6= i and pi 6= _pi, then S \ H ij;k(wi; p) = S \ H ij;k(wi; _p) for each
1  wi  12 by Lemma 11, and thus ij;k(; p) = ij;k(; _p) for each  2 [0; 12 ]. Now,
we only need to prove that lim
!1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
if and only if ij;k(
1
2
; p) = 1
4
because if
ij;k(
1
2
; p) 6= 1
4
, then S \H ij;k(12 ; p) has two elements at which player j has either 0 or
1
2
.
First, we prove that for some p 2 B(i; j; k), if ij;k(12 ; p) = 14 then limwi !1=2 
i
j;k(wi; p) =
1
4
. Suppose that for some p 2 B(i; j; k), there exists (w; p) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p) with wi = 12
and wj = 14 . Without loss of generality, we assume that player i is together with player
j in a common region, i.e., pi = pj. Since 
i
j;k(; p) is uniformly continuous on [0; 12)
by Lemma 14, lim
wi !1=2
ij;k(wi; p) always exists. Let b = lim
wi !1=2
ij;k(wi; p). Suppose
by way of contradiction that b 6= 1
4
.
Let b > 1
4
rst. Then there exists _wi such that 
i
j;k(1  _wi; p) = 14 by the continuity
of ij;k(; p) on [0; 12), and thus there exists the allocation _w such that _wj = 14 and
( _w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p). Let _p 2 RI such that _pz = pz for each z 6= i and _pi = pk.
Then the state ( _w; _p) dominates (w; p) by player i pillaging player k at (w; p) since
_wi > wi, _wk < wk, and _wj = wj. Thus we have that ( _w; _p) =2 S. However, every
state that results from player i pillaging either player j or player k at ( _w; _p) dominates
( _w; p) 2 S as well. Every state that results from either player j or player k moving his
region to pillage, regardless of the movement of player i, is dominated by some state
in the core such that player i has the entire wealth. Therefore, S cannot dominate
( _w; _p), and thus S lacks external stability.
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Let b < 1
4
next. Then there exists  2 [0; 1
2
) with    ij;k(; p) > 14 , and thus
there exists 00 such that 00   ij;k(00; p) = 14 since ij;k(; p) is continuous on [0; 12).
Then there exists ( w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p) with wk = 14 and wj = ij;k(00; p), and ( w; p)
dominates (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p) by player i pillaging player j at (w; p). This shows
that S lacks internal stability. Consequently, these contradictions ensure that b = 1
4
.
Lastly, we prove that for some p 2 B(i; j; k), if lim
 !1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
, then ij;k(
1
2
; p) =
1
4
. Suppose that for some p 2 B(i; j; k), lim
 !1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
. Note that (w; p) 2
Bij;k(
1
2
; p) with wi = 12 , wj =
1
4
, and pi = pj is dominated only either by player i
pillaging another player at (w; p), or by players i and j pillaging player k at (w; p).
Note that ij;k(; p) and  ij;k(; p) denote player j0s allocation and player k0s allo-
cation, respectively, when player i has 1   at the distribution p in the stable set S.
Because lim
 !1=2
ij;k(; p) =
1
4
, we have that lim
 !1=2
(  ij;k(; p)) = 14 . Therefore, the
basic condition implies that a state (w00; p) such that w00j <
1
4
and w00k =
1
4
is not in S.
Such a state (w00; p) results from player i pillaging player j at (w; p). Furthermore,
the basic condition implies that a state (w000; p) such that w000j =
1
4
and w000k <
1
4
is not
in S. By Lemma 11, S cannot contain such a state (w000; _p) that results from player
i pillaging player k at (w; p). Finally, every state that results from players i and j
pillaging player k at (w; p) is dominated by some state in the core such that player
i has all of the wealth. Therefore, S must contain (w; p) to satisfy external stability,
and thus we have that ij;k(
1
2
; p) = 1
4
.
Jordan (2005) studied the pillage game of "wealth is power" power function with-
out spatial restriction and found the unique stable set, the set of dyadic allocations.
Denition 17 introduces a dyadic state that satises three conditions below and the
set of dyadic states D. Theorem 18 establishes that the set D is the unique stable
set in a one-region model. Note that Denition 17 and Theorem 18 are adapted from
Jordan (2005) for the spatial pillage game.
Denition 17 An allocation w 2 A is dyadic if for each i, wi = 0 or (12)ki for some
nonnegative integer ki. A state (w; p) is dyadic if it satises that i) w is dyadic; ii)
for each r 2 R, Pi2pr wi = 0; 12 ; or 1; and iii) if there exists a region r0 2 R withP
i2pr0 wi =
1
2
, then there exists player z with wz = 12 . The set D denotes the set of
dyadic states.
Theorem 18 (Theorem 3.3 in Jordan, 1999) In a one-region model, the unique
stable set is D.
Lemma 19 reveals another implication of Theorem 18. It applies Theorem 18 to
a general model, which possibly can have more than one region.
Lemma 19 Dene the set X of states by X = f(w; p) 2 X : for each region r 2 R,P
i2pr wi = 0;
1
2
; or 1 and if for some region r0 2 R, Pi2pr0 wi = 12 , then for some
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player z, wz = 12g. Then D is the unique set that satises both internal stability and
external stability with respect to X. In addition, a stable set includes D.
Proof. For any region r 2 R and any distribution _p 2 RI , dene the set X(r; _p)
of states by X(r; _p) = f(w; p) 2 X : p = _p and Pi2 _pr wi = 1g. We rst show
that D \X(r; p) is the unique set that satises both internal stability and external
stability with respect toX(r; p). By Theorem 18, the unique stable set in a one-region
model is the set of dyadic states. Given a region r 2 R and a distribution p 2 RI ,
dene the function wr;p : X  ! [0; 1]#pr by wr;p(w; p)1 = wmin pr ; :::; wr;p(w; p)#pr =
wmax pr ; that is, wr;p projects from X onto allocations of players in the region r of the
distribution p. Then fwr;p(w; p) : (w; p) 2 D \ X(r; p)g is the set of allocations of
dyadic states in the #pr-player one-region model, and thus it is the unique stable set
by Theorem 18 in this one-region model. Note that in a one-region model, dominance
relation between states is well dened without distributions. Thus it is easily seen
that (w0; p) 2 X(r; p) dominates (w; p) 2 X(r; p) if and only if wr;p(w0; p) dominates
wr;p(w; p) in the #pr-player one-region model; both mean that
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz >P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz. Therefore, D \X(r; p) is the unique set that satises both internal
stability and external stability with respect to X(r; p) because fwr;p(w; p) : (w; p) 2
D\X(r; p)g is the unique stable set of allocations in the#pr-player one-region model.
For any region r 2 R, any distribution _p 2 RI , and any player z with _pz =2 _pr,
dene the set X(z; r; _p) of states by X(z; r; _p) = f(w; p) 2 X : p = _p, Pi2 _pr wi = 12 ,
and wz = 12g. We second prove that D \ X(z; r; p) is the unique set that satises
both internal stability and external stability with respect to X(z; r; p). Note that
(w0; p) 2 X(z; r; p) dominates (w; p) 2 X(z; r; p) if and only if 2wr;p(w0; p) dominates
2wr;p(w; p) in the #pr-player one-region model. It is easily seen that f2wr;p(w; p) :
(w; p) 2 D \ X(z; r; p)g is the set of allocations of dyadic states in the #pr-player
one-region model, and thus by Theorem 18, f2wr;p(w; p) : (w; p) 2 D \X(z; r; p)g is
the unique stable set. Therefore, D \X(z; r; p) is the unique set that satises both
internal stability and external stability with respect to X(z; r; p).
Third, we check that a state in X(r; p) can be dominated only by another state in
X(r; p). If (w; p) 2 X(r; p) is dominated by another state (w0; p0), then because the
coalition fi : w0i > wig  pr pillages the coalition fi : w0i < wig  pr within region r,
we have that pi = p0i = r for any i 2 fi : w0i 6= wig. Since the pillage does not a¤ect
the coalition fi : w0i = wig, we have that pi = p0i for any i 2 fi : w0i = wig. Since
p0 = p and p0i = r for each i 2 fi : w0i > 0g, we have that (w0; p0) 2 X(r; p).
Suppose that S  X is a set that satises both internal stability and external
stability with respect to X. We next demonstrate that S = D. The set S must
dominate every state in X(r; p) n S. However, X(r; p) n S can be dominated only by
some state in X(r; p), and thus S\X(r; p) dominates every state in X(r; p)n S. Since
S\X(r; p) is internally stable, S\X(r; p) is a set that satises both internal stability
and external stability with respect to X(r; p). Therefore, we have that S \X(r; p) =
D \ X(r; p). Since r and p are arbitrary, we have that S \ S(r;p)2RRI X(r; p) =
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D\S(r;p)2RRI X(r; p). Note that a state inX(z; r; p) can be dominated only by some
state in X(z; r; p) [S(r;p)2RRI X(r; p). Any state in D \S(r;p)2RRI X(r; p) cannot
dominate another state in X(z; r; p) because a state (w0; p0) that results from player
z with wz = 12 and pz 6= r pillaging other players at region r at (w; p) in X(z; r; p) has
1 > w0z >
1
2
, and thus (w0; p0) =2 D. Therefore, S\X(z; r; p)must dominate every state
in X(z; r; p)n S because S dominates every state in X(z; r; p)n S. Since S\X(z; r; p)
is internally stable, S\X(z; r; p) satises both internal stability and external stability
with respect to X(z; r; p). Thus we have that S \X(z; r; p) = D \X(z; r; p) because
D \ X(z; r; p) is the unique set that satises both internal stability and external
stability with respect to X(z; r; p). Since r, p, and z with _pz =2 _pr are arbitrary, we
have that S \S(r;p)2RRI (Sz =2pr X(z; r; p)) = D\S(r;p)2RRI (Sz =2pr X(z; r; p)). SinceS
(r;p)2RRI (X(r; p) [
S
z =2pr X(z; r; p)) = X and S;D  X, we have that S = D.
Finally, we complete the proof that D is the unique set that satises both internal
stability and external stability with respect to X. We have proven that if a set
satises both internal stability and external stability with respect to X, then it must
be D. Therefore, we need to show that D satises both internal stability and external
stability with respect to X. Because for any states (w; p); (w0; p0) 2 D, we have
that
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz 
P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz or
P
z2fi:wi>w0igw
0
z 
P
z2fi:wi<w0igw
0
z, the set
D is internally stable. Note that for each r, p, and z with pz =2 pr, D \ X(r; p)
and D \ X(z; r; p) satisfy external stability with respect to X(r; p) and X(z; r; p),
respectively. Therefore, D is externally stable with respect to X. Consequently, D
satises both internal stability and external stability with respect to X.
In addition, It is easily seen that a stable set S includes D. Note that a state
in X can be dominated only by another state in X. Every state (w0; p0) that results
from player z with wz = 12 being involved in pillaging other players at (w; p) in
X
satises that
P
i2p0r w
0
i = 1 for some r 2 R and thus that (w0; p0) 2 X. Every state
(w00; p00) that results from players in some region r pillaging other players in the same
region r at (w; p) in X satises that for each r 2 R, Pi2p00r w00i = 0; 12 ; or 1 and that
if
P
i2p00r w
00
i =
1
2
for some region r 2 R, then w00z = 12 for some player z. Thus we
have that (w00; p00) 2 X. Since a stable set S dominates every state in X n S, S \ X
dominates every state in X nS. Since S \ X is internally stable, S \ X satises both
internal stability and external stability with respect to X. Therefore, we have that
S \ X = D and thus that D  S. Since S is an arbitrary stable set, a stable set
includes D.
Proposition 20 completely characterizes stable sets in the three-player and two-
region model.
Proposition 20 In the three-player and two-region model, a set S is a stable set if
and only if S = B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [D for some basic functions 12;3, 23;1,
and 31;2.
Proof. We prove the necessary condition rst. Suppose that S is a stable set. By
Lemma 16, there exist basic functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2 such that B(
1
2;3)[B(23;1)[
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B(31;2)  S. By Lemma 19, we have that D  S. Therefore, we must have that
B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[D  S. To show that B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[D  S,
it su¢ ces to show that B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) [D is externally stable.
Let _S = B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [D. If (w; p) 2 X n _S with wz < 12 for each
z 2 I, then (w; p) is dominated by some state in D such that two players have halves.
Let X = f(w; p) 2 X : for each region r 2 R, Pi2pr wi = 0; 12 ; or 1 and if for some
region r0 2 R, Pi2pr0 wi = 12 , then for some player z, wz = 12g. If (w; p) 2 X n _S and
(w; p) 2 X, then by Lemma 19, (w; p) is dominated by some state in D such that
either two players have halves, or one player has all of the wealth. If (w; p) 2 X n _S
with wi > 12 and pj = pk, then (w; p) is dominated by some state in D such that
player i has all of the wealth.
Let (w; p) 2 X n _S satisfy that p 2 B(i; j; k) and (w; p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; p). Without loss
of generality, we assume that pi = pj. Since 1 > wi  12 and a basic function ij;k(; p) :
[0; 1
2
] ! [0; 1
2
] is uniformly continuous on [0; 1
2
), lim !1 wi 
i
j;k(; p) is well dened.
If wi > 12 and wj > 
i
j;k(1   wi; p) or wi = 12 and wj > lim !1 wi ij;k(; p), both of
which mean that wj > lim !1 wi 
i
j;k(; p), then wk < 1  wi  lim !1 wi ij;k(; p).
Thus there exists a state (w; p) 2 B(ij;k) with wi > wi and wk = wk. In this
case, (w; p) dominates (w; p) by player i pillaging player j. If wi > 12 and wj <
ij;k(1 wi; p) or wi = 12 and wj < lim !1 wi ij;k(; p), both of which mean that wj <
lim !1 wi 
i
j;k(; p), then (w
0; _p) 2 B(ij;k) such that w0j = lim !1 wi ij;k(; p),
_pz = pz for all z 6= i, and _pi 6= pi dominates (w; p) by player i pillaging player k. If
wi =
1
2
and wj = lim !1 wi 
i
j;k(; p) 6= 14 , then some state in the core such that
two players have halves dominates (w; p). Therefore, _S is externally stable, and thus
_S = S.
Next, we prove the su¢ cient condition, that is, if functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2 are
basic functions, then the set B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) [D is a stable set. Suppose
that S 0 = B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [ D for some basic functions 12;3, 23;1, and
31;2. Then S
0 is externally stable as shown above. Now, we need to show that S 0 is
internally stable.
Notice that each B(i; j; k) has four elements and each element p in B(i; j; k) has
its counterpart distribution _p such that _p 2 B(i; j; k), pi 6= _pi, _pj = pj, and _pk = pk.
For example, B(1; 2; 3) = f(1; 1; 2); (1; 2; 1); (2; 1; 2); (2; 2; 1)g and (1; 1; 2) and (1; 2; 1)
are counterpart distributions to (2; 1; 2) and (2; 2; 1), respectively. Therefore, by the
second condition of a basic function, if (w; p); (w0; p) 2 B(ij;k) with wi > w0i > 12 and
pi = pj, then (w; _p); (w0; _p) 2 B(ij;k) with _pi = _pk, and vice versa. Then we have
that wj  w0j and wk < w0k by the rst condition of a basic function since pi = pj and
_pi = _pk. Similarly, we have that wj < w0j and wk  w0k. Consequently, we have that
wj < w
0
j and wk < w
0
k.
First, we prove that each B(12;3), B(
2
3;1), and B(
3
1;2) is internally stable. Let
(w; p); (w0; p0) 2 B(ij;k) such that (w; p) 6= (w0; p0) and (w; p) =2 C, which is the core.
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Since fpj; pkg = fp0j; p0kg = R, i.e., players j and k are distributed all over regions at
p and p0, we have that either p0j 6= pj and p0k 6= pk, or p0j = pj and p0k = pk. Thus if
p0j 6= pj, then fz : pz 6= p0zg * pr for each r 2 R, and so (w0; p0) does not dominate
(w; p).
Suppose that p and p0 satises that p0j = pj and p
0
k = pk. If wi; w
0
i >
1
2
, then
i) wj < w
0
j and wk < w
0
k; ii) wj > w
0
j and wk > w
0
k; or iii) w = w
0. If either i)
wj < w
0
j and wk < w
0
k, or ii) wj > w
0
j and wk > w
0
k, then fz : w0z 6= wzg * pr for
each r 2 R. If w = w0 then Pz2fi:w0i>wigwz = Pz2fi:w0i<wigwz = 0. If wi > 12 and
w0i =
1
2
, then
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz 
1
2
<
P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz. If wi =
1
2
, wj = 14 , and w
0
i >
1
2
,
then since lim ! 1
2
ij;k() =
1
4
, wj = 14 > w
0
j and wk =
1
4
> w0k. Thus we have that
fi : w0i 6= wig * pr for each r 2 R. If wi = 12 , wj = 14 , and w0i = 12 , then since
w0j =
1
4
or 1
2
, we have that
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz =
P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz = 0 or
1
4
. Therefore,
in these cases, (w0; p0) does not dominate (w; p). Since (w; p); (w0; p0) 2 B(ij;k) with
(w; p) 6= (w0; p0) and (w; p) =2 C are arbitrary, each set B(12;3), B(23;1), and B(31;2)
is internally stable.
Second, we check internal stability of the set B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2). Let
(w; p) 2 B(ij;k) and (w00; p00) 2 B(jk;i). Then wi  12 and w00j  12 , and thus wj  12
and w00i  12 . If wi > w00i then
P
z2fy:w00y>wygwz  12  wi 
P
z2fy:w00y<wygwz. If
wi = w
00
i then wi = w
00
i =
1
2
. Since wj 2 f14 ; 12g by the third condition of a basic
function,
P
z2fi:w00i >wigwz =
P
z2fi:w00i <wigwz = 0 or
1
4
. Therefore, (w; p) does not
dominate (w00; p00). Similarly, we can prove that (w00; p00) does not dominate (w; p).
Consequently, B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) is internally stable.
Finally, we examine internal stability of S 0 = B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[D. Note
that (B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2)) \ X  C and that C  D. Since a state in D can
be dominated only by another state in X and D is internally stable, any state in D is
not dominated by another state in B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2). Therefore, it su¢ ces
to show that any state in B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) is not dominated by another
state in D. Let (w; p) 2 B(ij;k). Then we have that wi  12 . If wi = 1 or wi = 12
and wj = 12 , then (w; p) 2 C, and thus (w; p) is not dominated by any state in D. If
1 > wi >
1
2
, then by the basic condition of B(ij;k), we have that wj > 0 and wk > 0.
Also, if wi = 12 and wj =
1
4
, then wk = 14 . In these cases, player i cannot pillage
both players j and k simultaneously since pj 6= pk and cannot be pillaged by another
player since wi > 12 > maxfwj; wkg. Thus if a state (w000; p000) dominates (w; p), then
(w000; p000) satises that for some player z, wz =2 f0; 14 ; 12 ; 1g, that is, (w000; p000) =2 D.
Since (w; p) is arbitrary, any state in B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2) is not dominated by
another state in D.
Therefore, S 0 is a stable set. Since functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2 are arbitrary basic
functions, B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) [D for any basic functions 12;3, 23;1, and 31;2
is a stable set.
Figures 3 and 4 show one possible stable set S on the hyperplanes. Dots and bold
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Figure 3: Stable set in the hyperplanes of states with p1 = 1
curves in the gures denote states in S at each distribution. As shown in the proof of
Proposition 20, the bold curves in the gures can be expressed with basic functions.
Theorem 21 generalizes Proposition 20 to the three-playerN region models where
N  2.
Theorem 21 In a three-player N region model where N  2, a set S is a stable set
if and only if S = B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[D [U(B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[C) for
some basic functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2 where the set U(B(
1
2;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[C)
is the set of states that are not dominated by any state in B(12;3)[B(23;1)[B(31;2)[C.
Proof. For any two distinct regions q; r 2 R, dene the set Xq;r of states by Xq;r =
f(w; p) 2 X : for each i, pi = q or rg. Then, it is easily seen that a state in
Xr;q can be dominated only by some state in Xr;q because the act of the pillage
does not disperse players. If there are more than two regions, then dene the set
X indiv: of states by X indiv: = f(w; p) 2 X : for any three distinct regions o; q; and
r, fp1; p2; p3g = fo; q; rgg. That is, X indiv: is the set of states at which each player
occupies its own region alone, i.e., individual region distribution. Note that any state
in X indiv: does not dominate any other state in X, however, it can be dominated by
some state at which only one region contains two players, whose distribution results
from one player pillaging another player. Therefore, a set S is a stable set if and
only if i) for any two distinct regions q and r, S \Xr;q is both internally stable and
19
Figure 4: Stable set in the hyperplanes of states with p1 = 2
externally stable with respect to Xr;q; and ii) S dominates all states in X indiv: except
itself X indiv: \ S.
In the three-player and two-region model, by Proposition 20, a set S is a stable
set if and only if S = B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [D for some basic functions 12;3,
23;1, and 
3
1;2. Without loss of generality, given any two distinct regions q and r, we
can regard a state (w; p) in Xr;q as the state (w; p) in the two-region model, and vice
versa. Then, it is easily seen that (w0; p0) 2 Xr;q dominates (w; p) 2 Xr;q if and only
if (w0; p0) dominates (w; p) in the two-region model. Therefore, for any two distinct
regions q and r, S \Xr;q is both internally stable and externally stable with respect
to Xr;q if and only if S \ Xr;q = (B(12;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [ D) \ Xr;q for some
basic functions 12;3, 
2
3;1, and 
3
1;2. The observation that for any basic functions 
1
2;3,
23;1, and 
3
1;2, the set B(
1
2;3) [ B(23;1) [ B(31;2) [ C dominates all states in X indiv:
except U(B(12;3) [B(23;1) [B(31;2) [ C) completes the proof.
Figures 5 and 6 show one possible stable set S on the hyperplanes. Figure 5
covers distributions where at least two players are in a common region and Figure 6
covers the other distributions, where each player occupies its own region alone. In
the gures, dots, bold lines, and the gray area denote states in the stable set S. Note
that except for the three corner points and three middle points, the gray area does
not contain boundary lines.
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Figure 5: Stable set in the hyperplanes of states such that pj = pk for two distinct
players j and k.
Figure 6: Stable set in the hyperplane of states such that p1 6= p2 6= p3 6= p1
21
2.2 Stable set in I player and N region models where I = 4
and N = 2, or I  4 and N  3
A stable set does not exist in a I player andN region model where I = 4 andN = 2,
or I  4 and N  3. First, we prove that in the four-player and two-region model, a
stable set must contain a group of states out of basic sets. Second, we discover some
properties of a group of states that are not in basic sets, but are in a stable set. Next,
we show that in the four-player and two-region model, if there exists a stable set S,
then we can nd a state (w; p) such that (w; p) cannot be in S and S cannot dominate
(w; p). It is because S contains four states and the properties of these states assure
that S dominates every state that dominates (w; p). Finally, we generalize the result
in the four-player and two-region model and verify the nonexistence of a stable set in
a I player and N region model where I  4 and N  3.
Lemma 22 shows another property of a stable set. To satisfy both internal and
external stabilities, a stable set must contain some states outside the basic sets as
well as some basic states. Lemma 22 reveals relation among states that are outside
the basic states and belong to some stable set.
Lemma 22 In the four-player and two-region model, for any player j, let a distribu-
tion p satisfy p1 = fjg or p2 = fjg. Then given a stable set S, there exists a positive
real number ap such that [0; ap]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)g. In particular, if
(w0; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p), then [0; w0j]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
Proof. Let a distribution _p 2 B(i; j; k) with _pz = pz for each z 6= i. Note that
B(i; j; k) is the set of distributions at which player i is together with only either
player j or player k; that is, at the distribution _p, there exists a region r 2 R
such that _pr = fi; jg or fi; kg. At the distribution p, player j is alone in a region and
player k is together with the other players including player i. Therefore, we must have
that _pi = _pj so that player i is together with only one player in a common region.
By Lemma 16, there exists a basic function ij;k with (B(
i
j;k) [ C) \ Bij;k(12 ; _p) =
S \ Bij;k(12 ; _p). By the rst condition of a basic function, there exists _ 2 (0; 12) with
ij;k(
_; _p) > 0. According to Corollary 15, ij;k(; _p) is uniformly continuous on [0; 12).
Since ij;k(0; _p) = 0, the intermediate value theorem implies that [0; 
i
j;k(
_; _p)] 
ij;k([0;
_]; _p).
To prove the rst assertion, it su¢ ces to show that [0; ij;k( _; _p)]  fwj : (w; p) 2
S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)g. For any  2 [0; ij;k( _; _p)], let  = minf 2 [0; _] : ij;k(; _p) = g,
which is well dened by the uniform continuity of ij;k on [0; _] because if a function
is continuous, then the inverse image of a closed set under the function is a closed set.
Given any  2 [0; _], let the allocation w satisfy that wi = 1  , wj = ij;k(; _p),
and wk =    ij;k(; _p). Then we have that (w; _p) 2 B(ij;k) \ Bij;k(12 ; _p) and thus
that (w; _p) 2 S. Suppose by way of contradiction that (w; p) =2 S. Every state
that results from player i pillaging either player j or player k at (w; p) dominates
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(w; _p) 2 S as well as (w; p). Every state that results from either player j or player
k engaging in pillage at (w; p), regardless of player i0s participation, is dominated by
some state in the core such that player i has the total wealth because players j and
k get together in a common region and player i has greater than a half. Therefore,
S cannot dominate (w; p), and thus S lacks external stability. This contradiction
guarantees that (w; p) 2 S and thus that  = wj 2 fwj : (w; p) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p)g since
(w; p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; p). Since  2 [0; ij;k( _; _p)] is arbitrary, we have that [0; ij;k( _; _p)] 
fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
In particular, if (w0; p) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p), then by Lemma 11, (w0; _p) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; _p).
By the same way as shown above, we can show that for any  2 [0; w0j],  2 fwj :
(w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g and thus that [0; w0j]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
Lemmas 23, 24, and 25 strengthen Lemma 22 by revealing relations between states
that are outside the basic states and belong to some stable set.
Lemma 23 In the four-player and two-region model, for any player j, let a distri-
bution p satisfy either p1 = fjg or p2 = fjg. Then given a stable set S, for any
a 2 (0; 1
2
), there exists a state (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p) such that a > wj +wk > wj > 0
and [0; wj]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)g. In addition, if (w0; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p)
with wj > w0j > 0, then we have that wk  w0k > 0.
Proof. By Lemma 16, there exists a basic function ij;k with B(
i
j;k)  S. Let
the distribution _p 2 B(i; j; k) satisfy _pz = pz for each z 6= i. Then since ij;k(; _p) is
dened on [0; 1
2
], for any a 2 (0; 1
2
), we can nd the allocation wa with waj = 
i
j;k(a; _p),
wak = a ij;k(a; _p), and wai = 1 a. Then we have that (wa; _p) 2 B(ij;k). By Lemma
22, there exists a state ( _w; p) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p) with _wj > 0 and [0; _wj]  fwj : (w; p) 2
S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g. Let a state (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p) satisfy that 0 < wj < minf _wj; waj g.
We will show that (w; p) satises all required conditions, that is, a > wj+wk > wj > 0
and [0; wj]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
Since (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p), by Lemma 11, we have that (w; _p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; _p).
Since waj > wj > 0 and w
a
i >
1
2
, the basic condition means that wi > wai and wk > 0,
and thus we have that a > 1  wi = wj + wk > wj > 0. Since (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p),
Lemma 22 assures the second condition, [0; wj]  fwj : (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)g.
In addition, let (w0; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p) with w0j 2 (0; wj). Then by Lemma 11, we
have that (w0; _p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; _p). Since wj > w0j > 0 and wi > 1   a > 12 , the basic
condition of S implies that wi < w0i < 1 and thus that wk  w0k > 0.
Lemma 24 In the four-player and two-region model, for the distinct four players i,
j, k, and y, let distributions p and p0 satisfy either p1 = fjg and p01 = fi; j; yg, or
p2 = fjg and p02 = fi; j; yg. Given a stable set S, suppose that (w; p) 2 S \Bij;k(12 ; p)
and (w0; p0) 2 S \Bik;y(12 ; p0). If wi; w0i > 12 and wj = w0k, then wk  wj or w0y  w0k.
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Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that wi; w0i >
1
2
, wj = w0k, wj > wk, and
w0k > w
0
y. Lemma 22 implies that [0; w
0
k]  fwk : (w; p0) 2 S \ Bik;y(12 ; p0)g. Since
w0k = wj > wk, there exists a state ( _w
0; p0) 2 S \ Bik;y(12 ; p0) with _w0k = wk. Let
_p0 2 B(i; k; y) satisfy _p0i 6= p0i and _p0z = p0z for each z 6= i. Since (w0; p0); ( _w0; p0) 2
S \ Bik;y(12 ; p0), we have that (w0; _p0); ( _w0; _p0) 2 S \ Bik;y(12 ; _p0) by Lemma 11. Since
wi; w
0
i >
1
2
and w0k > wk = _w
0
k, the basic condition of S means that w
0
i < _w
0
i and
thus that w0y  _w0y. Since w0k > w0y, we have that wj = w0k > w0y  _w0y and thus that
_w0i = 1  _w0k  _w0y > 1  _w0k wj = 1 wk wj = wi. Since wi+wj +wk = 1, we have
that wy = 0. Therefore, we have that _w0i > wi >
1
2
, _w0k = wk, and _w
0
y > wy = 0. Note
that the distribution p0 results from players i and y moving to the region of player j
at the distribution p. Therefore, ( _w0; p0) 2 S dominates (w; p) 2 S by players i and
y pillaging player j at (w; p). This contradiction guarantees that if wi; w0i >
1
2
and
wj = w
0
k, then wk  wj or w0y  w0k.
Lemma 25 In the four-player and two-region model, for any player j, let a dis-
tribution p satisfy either p1 = fjg or p2 = fjg. Given a stable set S, if (w; p) 2
S \Bij;k(12 ; p) and (w0; p) 2 S \Bij;y(12 ; p) with wj = w0j > 0, then wi = w0i.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that (w; p) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p), (w0; p) 2 S \
Bij;y(
1
2
; p), wj = w0j > 0 and wi 6= w0i. Since (w; p) 2 Bij;k(12 ; p) and (w0; p) 2 Bij;y(12 ; p),
we have that wi  12  wj+wk and w0i  12  w0j+w0y. Since wj; w0j > 0, we have that
wi > wk and w0i > w
0
y. Therefore, if wi > w
0
i then (w; p) 2 S dominates (w0; p) 2 S
by either player i or players i and k pillaging player y at (w0; p). Similarly, if wi < w0i
then (w0; p) 2 S dominates (w; p) 2 S. This contradiction completes the proof.
Lemma 26 synthesizes the previous results in this subsection and shows that in
the four-player and two-region model, a stable set S contains four distinct states that
satisfy six conditions introduced in this lemma. We can use these four states to show
nonexistence of stable set. The six conditions guarantee that there exists a state
(w; p) that S cannot contain or dominate.
Lemma 26 In the four-player and two-region model, a stable set S contains four
states ( _w; p0), ( w; p00), (
...
w; p000), and (w; p000) such that for some four distinct players i,
j, k, and y, i) distributions p0, p00, and p000 satisfy either p01 = fjg, p001 = fi; j; yg, and
p0001 = fkg, or p02 = fjg, p002 = fi; j; yg, and p0002 = fkg; ii) ( _w; p0) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0),
( w; p00) 2 S \Bik;j(12 ; p00), and (
...
w; p000); (w; p000) 2 S \Bik;j(12 ; p000); iii) wk > _wk  _wj >
0; iv) wj;
...
wj <
1
4
; v) 1
4
>
...
wk > _wk + _wj; and vi) wj  wk = _wj.
Proof. Let distributions p, p(1), p(2), p(3), p(4), and p(5) satisfy that either
p1 = fi; j; yg, p(1)1 = fjg, p(2)1 = fi; j; kg, p(3)1 = fkg, p(4)1 = fi; k; yg, and
p(5)1 = fyg; or p2 = fi; j; yg, p(1)2 = fjg, p(2)2 = fi; j; kg, p(3)2 = fkg, p(4)2 =
fi; k; yg, and p(5)2 = fyg. By Lemma 23, there exist states ( w; p) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p),
( w(1); p(1)) 2 S \ Bij;y(12 ; p(1)), (
...
w(2); p(2)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(2)), (
...
w(3); p(3)) 2 S \
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Bik;j(
1
2
; p(3)), (
...
w(4); p(4)) 2 S \ Bij;y(12 ; p(4)), and ( w(5); p(5)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(5))
with 0 < wj; wk; w
(1)
j ; w
(1)
y ;
...
w(2)k ;
...
w(2)y ;
...
w(3)j ;
...
w(3)k ;
...
w(4)j ;
...
w(4)y ; w
(5)
k ; w
(5)
y < 14 . Lemma 23
also implies that there exist states ( _w; p) 2 S \ Bik;y(12 ; p), (w; p) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p),
( _w(1); p(1)) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p(1)), (w(1); p(1)) 2 S \ Bij;y(12 ; p(1)), ( _w(2); p(2)) 2 S \
Biy;j(
1
2
; p(2)), (w(2); p(2)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(2)), (w(3); p(3)) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p(3)), and
(w(4); p(4)) 2 S \ Bij;y(12 ; p(4)) such that 0 < _wk + _wy; _w(1)j + _w(1)k ; _w(2)j + _w(2)y <
minf wk; w(1)j ; w(5)y ;
...
w(2)y ;
...
w(3)k ;
...
w(4)j g and _wk = wk = _w(1)j = w(1)j = _w(2)y = w(2)y =
w
(3)
k = w
(4)
j > 0.
Since _w(1)j = w
(1)
j > 0, Lemma 25 means that _w
(1)
i = w
(1)
i and thus that _w
(1)
k =
w
(1)
y . If w
(1)
y  w(1)j then _w(1)k = w(1)y  w(1)j = _w(1)j . Therefore, if w(1)y  w(1)j
and w(3)j  w(3)k , then the states ( _w(1); p(1)), ( w; p), (
...
w(3); p(3)), and (w(3); p(3))
satisfy all required conditions; that is, for some four distinct players i, j, k, and
y, i) distributions p(1), p, and p(3) satisfy either p(1)1 = fjg, p1 = fi; j; yg, and
p(3)1 = fkg, or p(1)2 = fjg, p2 = fi; j; yg, and p(3)2 = fkg; ii) ( _w(1); p(1)) 2
S\Bij;k(12 ; p(1)), ( w; p) 2 S\Bik;j(12 ; p), and (
...
w(3); p(3)); (w(3); p(3)) 2 S\Bik;j(12 ; p(3));
iii) wk > _w
(1)
k  _w(1)j > 0; iv) wj;
...
w(3)j <
1
4
; v) 1
4
>
...
w(3)k > _w
(1)
j + _w
(1)
k ; and vi)
w
(3)
j  w(3)k = _w(1)j .
Note that if wi = 12 , then since wj + wk =
1
2
and wk < 14 , we have that wj >
1
4
> wk, and thus some state in the core such that players i and j have halves
dominates (w; p) 2 S. This contradiction shows that we must have that wi > 12 .
Similarly, we can show that we have that w(1)i , w
(2)
i , w
(3)
i , and w
(4)
i >
1
2
. Therefore,
if w(1)y < w
(1)
j , then since wi, w
(1)
i , and w
(2)
i >
1
2
, Lemma 24 implies that wj  wk
and w(2)k  w(2)y . Since _wk = wk, by Lemma 25, we have that _wi = wi and thus
that _wy = wj  wk = _wk. In this case, the states ( _w; p), ( w(5); p(5)), (...w(2); p(2)),
and (w(2); p(2)) satisfy all six conditions; that is, for some four distinct players i, k,
y, and j, i) distributions p, p(5), and p(2) satisfy p1 = fkg, p(5)1 = fi; j; kg, and
p(2)1 = fyg, or p2 = fkg, p(5)2 = fi; j; kg, and p(2)2 = fyg; ii) ( _w; p) 2 S\Bik;y(12 ; p),
( w(5); p(5)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(5)), and (
...
w(2); p(2)), (w(2); p(2)) 2 S \ Biy;k(12 ; p(2)); iii)
w
(5)
y > _wy  _wk > 0, iv) w(5)k ;
...
w(2)k <
1
4
, v) 1
4
>
...
w(2)y > _wk + _wy, and vi) w
(2)
k 
w
(2)
y = _wk. Similarly, if w
(3)
j < w
(3)
k , then ( _w
(2); p(2)), ( w(1); p(1)), (
...
w(4); p(4)), and
(w(4); p(4)) satisfy all six conditions.
Proposition 27 proves nonexistence of stable set in the four-player and two-region
model.
Proposition 27 No stable set exists in the four-player and two-region model.
Proof. By way of contradiction, suppose that there exists a stable set S in the
four-player and two-region model. Then by Lemma 26, there exist four states ( _w; p0),
( w; p00), (
...
w; p000), and (w; p000) such that for some four distinct players i, j, k, and y,
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i) distributions p0, p00, and p000 satisfy either p01 = fjg, p001 = fi; j; yg, and p0001 = fkg,
or p02 = fjg, p002 = fi; j; yg, and p0002 = fkg; ii) ( _w; p0) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0), ( w; p00) 2
S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00), and (
...
w; p000), (w; p000) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p000); iii) wk > _wk  _wj > 0; iv)
wj;
...
wj <
1
4
; v) 1
4
>
...
wk > _wk + _wj; and vi) wj  wk = _wj.
Dene the set of states T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) = f(w; p) : wi = 1  _wj2 , wj = _wj,minf wk;
...
wk 
_wjg  wk > _wk, and p = p0g. Then, we can show that T ( _w; w; ...w; p0) has uncount-
ably many elements. Note that by conditions iii) and v), minf wk; ...wk   _wjg > _wk.
Let a 2 R4 satisfy that ai = 1  _wj2 , aj = _wj, minf wk;
...
wk   _wjg  ak > _wk, and
ay = 1  ai   aj   ak. Since 1 > _wj > 0 and _wk > 0, we have that ai; aj; ak 2 (0; 1).
Note that ay = 1   1  _wj2   _wj   ak > 12   _wj2   _wk > 14 , that is, ay 2 (14 ; 1). Since
ai+aj+ak+ay = 1, a is an allocation in the four-player model. Since a satises all re-
quirements to be an allocation in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0), we have that (a; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0).
It is easily seen that for any " 2 (0; ak  _wk), ((ai; aj; ak "; ay+"); p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0).
We will prove that T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) contains some state that S cannot contain or
dominate. First, we show that there exists a state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) that S cannot
contain. Note that for any distinct states (w; p0), (w0; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0), we have
that wi = w0i, wj = w
0
j, and either w
0
y > wy > wk > w
0
k or wy > w
0
y > w
0
k > wk. If
w0y > wy > wk > w
0
k, then (w
0; p0) dominates (w0; p0) by player y pillaging player k.
Similarly, if wy > w0y > w
0
k > wk, then (w; p
0) dominates (w0; p0). Therefore, internal
stability of S means that T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) \ S has at most one element. In addition,
for any (w; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0), there exists a state (w00; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0) such that
w00i = wi, w
00
j = wj, and w
00
y > wy > wk > w
00
k ; that is, every state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) is
dominated by another state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0). Therefore, there exists a state (wT ; p0) 2
T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) such that (wT ; p0) dominates a state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) \ S, which can
be empty. Then we have that (wT ; p0) =2 S. Next, we show that S cannot dominate
(wT ; p0).
Let the set of states T1(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player i pillaging
player j at (wT ; p0)g. Note that wTk +wTy = 1 wTi  wTj = 1  1  _wj2   _wj = 1  _wj2 = wTi .
Let (wT1 ; p) 2 T1(wT ; p0). Since wTi = wTk + wTy , wTj = _wj, and wTk > _wk, we have
that wT1i > w
T1
k + w
T1
y , w
T1
j < w
T
j = _wj, and w
T1
k = w
T
k > _wk. Since ( _w; p
0) 2
S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0), Lemma 22 implies that [0; _wj]  fwj : (w; p0) 2 S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0)g.
Therefore, S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0) contains ( _wT1 ; p0) with _wT1j = wT1j . Since _wj > _wT1j , by
Lemma 23, we have that _wk  _wT1k and thus that wT1k > _wT1k . Therefore, (wT1 ; p) in
T1(w
T ; p0) is dominated by ( _wT1 ; p0) in S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0) by player i pillaging players k
and y. Since (wT1 ; p) 2 T1(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, every state in T1(wT ; p0) is dominated
by some state in S \Bij;k(12 ; p0) through player i pillaging players k and y. Therefore,
we must have that T1(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T2(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player i pillaging
player k at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT2 ; p0) 2 T2(wT ; p0), we have that wT2i >
wT2k + w
T2
y , w
T2
j = _wj, and w
T2
y = w
T
y > w
T
k > _wk since w
T
i = w
T
k + w
T
y , w
T
j = _wj,
and wTy >
1
4
> wTk . Therefore, every state in T2(w
T ; p0) is dominated by ( _w; p0) 2
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S \ Bij;k(12 ; p0) through players i and k pillaging player y when _wk > wT2k , through
player i pillaging player y when _wk = w
T2
k , or through player i pillaging players k and
y when _wk < w
T2
k . Therefore, we have that T2(w
T ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T3(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player i pillaging
player y at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT3 ; p0) 2 T3(wT ; p0), we have that wT3i >
wT3k + w
T3
y , w
T3
j = _wj, and w
T3
k = w
T
k > _wk since w
T
i = w
T
k + w
T
y , w
T
j = _wj, and
wTk > _wk. Therefore, every state in T3(w
T ; p0) is dominated by ( _w; p0) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p0)
through player i either pillaging players k and y when wT3y > 0, or pillaging player k
when wT3y = 0. Therefore, we have that T3(w
T ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T4(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player y pillaging
player k at (wT ; p0)g. Let (wT4 ; p0) 2 T4(wT ; p0). Since wTi = wTk + wTy and wTy >
1
4
> _wk, we have that w
T4
i  wT4y > _wk and wT4j = _wj. Note that dominance relation
in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) is transitive; that is, if (w; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0) is dominated by
(w0; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0) and (w0; p0) is dominated by (w00; p0) 2 T ( _w; w; ...w; p0), then
because wi = w0i = w
00
i , wj = w
0
j = w
00
j , and w
00
y > w
0
y > wy > wk > w
0
k > w
00
k , (w; p
0)
is dominated by (w00; p0) through player y pillaging player k at (w; p0). Therefore, if
wT4k > _wk, then (w
T4 ; p) is still in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) and thus since (wT ; p0) dominates
a state in T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) \ S, which can be empty, (wT4 ; p0) dominates a state in
T ( _w; w;
...
w; p0) \ S. This means that (wT4 ; p0) =2 S. If _wk  wT4k > 0, then (wT4 ; p0) is
dominated by ( _w; p0) in S \Bij;k(12 ; p0) either through player i pillaging player y when
_wk = w
T4
k , or through players i and k pillaging player y when _wk > w
T4
k . If w
T4
k = 0,
then wT4i = w
T4
y > w
T4
j , and thus (w
T4 ; p0) is dominated by some state in the core such
that players i and y have halves. Since (wT4 ; p0) 2 T4(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, we have
that T4(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T5(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player y pillaging
player j at (wT ; p1)g. Then for each (wT5 ; p) 2 T5(wT ; p0), we have that wT5i + wT5k >
wT5j +w
T5
y and
1
2
> wT5i > w
T5
k since w
T
i > w
T
y , w
T
k > w
T
j and
1
2
> wTi > w
T
k . Therefore,
every state in T5(wT ; p0) is dominated by some state in the core such that players i
and k have halves. Therefore, we have that T5(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T6(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from player k pillaging
player j at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT6 ; p) 2 T6(wT ; p0), we have that wT6i + wT6y >
wT6j +w
T6
k and
1
2
> wT6i > w
T6
y since
1
2
> wTi > w
T
y > w
T
k > w
T
j . Therefore, every state
in T6(wT ; p0) is dominated by some state in the core such that players i and y have
halves. Therefore, we have that T6(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T7(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i and y
pillaging player k at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT7 ; p) 2 T7(wT ; p0), we have that
wT7i > w
T7
k + w
T7
y , w
T
j = _wj, and w
T7
y > _wk since w
T
i = w
T
k + w
T
y and w
T
y > _wk.
Therefore, every state in T7(wT ; p0) is dominated by ( _w; p0) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p0). Therefore,
we have that T7(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T8(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i and y
pillaging player j at (wT ; p0)g. Let (wT8 ; p00) 2 T8(wT ; p0). Since wTi > wTj + wTy ,
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wk  wTk , and wTy > 14 > wj, we have that wT8i > wT8j + wT8y , wk  wTk = wT8k , and
wT8y > w
T
y > wj. When w
T8
k = wk, (w
T8 ; p00) is dominated by ( w; p00) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00)
through player i pillaging players j and y when wj < w
T8
j , through player i pillaging
player y when wj = w
T8
j , or through players i and j pillaging player y when wj > w
T8
j .
Now, we check the case that wk > w
T8
k . Since ( w; p
00) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00), Lemma 22
implies that [0; wk]  fwk : (w; p00) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00)g. Therefore, S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00)
contains the state ( wT8 ; p00) such that wT8k = w
T8
k . Since wk > w
T8
k , Lemma 23 implies
that wj  wT8j and thus that wT8y > wTy > 14 > wj  wT8j . Therefore, (wT8 ; p00) 2
T8(w
T ; p0) is dominated by the state ( wT8 ; p00) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00) through player i
pillaging players j and y when wT8j < w
T8
j , through player i pillaging player y when
wT8j = w
T8
j , or through players i and j pillaging player y when w
T8
j > w
T8
j . Since
(wT8 ; p00) 2 T8(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, we have that T8(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T9(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i and k
pillaging player y at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT9 ; p0) 2 T9(wT ; p0), we have that
wT9i > w
T9
k + w
T9
y , w
T9
j = _wj, and w
T9
k > _wk since w
T
i = w
T
k + w
T
y and w
T
k > _wk.
Therefore, every state in T9(wT ; p0) is dominated by ( _w; p0) 2 S\Bij;k(12 ; p0). Therefore,
we have that T9(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T10(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i and k
pillaging player j at (wT ; p0)g. Let (wT10 ; p) 2 T10(wT ; p0). Since wTi > wTy > 14 ,
wj  wk = _wj = wTj , and
...
wk   _wj  wTk > _wj, we have that wT10i > wT10y > 14 ,
wj  wTj > wT10j , and
...
wk > w
T10
k > wk. Since (
...
w; p000) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p000), Lemma 22
implies that [0;
...
wk]  fwk : (w; p000) 2 S \ Bik;j(12 ; p000)g. Therefore, S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00)
contains the state (
...
wT10 ; p000) with
...
wT10k = w
T10
k . Since
...
wk > w
T10
k > wk, Lemma 23
means that
...
wj  ...wT10j  wj. Since wT10y > 14 >
...
wj  ...wT10j > wT10j , (
...
wT10 ; p000) 2
S \ Bik;j(12 ; p00) dominates the state (wT10 ; p) by players i and j pillaging player y.
Since (wT10 ; p) 2 T10(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, every state in T10(wT ; p0) is dominated by
some state in S \Bik;j(12 ; p000). Therefore, we have that T10(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Let the set of states T11(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players k and y
pillaging player j at (wT ; p0)g. Then for each (wT11 ; p) 2 T11(wT ; p0), we have that
wT11i < w
T11
j +w
T11
k +w
T11
y ,
1
2
> wT11y , and
1
4
> wT11k > w
T11
j since w
T
i < w
T
j +w
T
k +w
T
y ,
1
2
> wTy + w
T
j , and
1
4
>
...
wk  wTk + wTj . Note that by Lemma 19, D  S. Therefore,
every state in T11(wT ; p0) is dominated by some state (w; p) in D such that wy = 12 ,
wj = wk =
1
4
, and pp
0
i = I through players j, k, and y pillaging player i. Therefore,
we have that T11(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Finally, let the set of states T12(wT ; p0) = f(w; p) : (w; p) results from players i, k,
and y pillaging player j at (wT ; p0)g. Let (wT12 ; p) 2 T12(wT ; p0). Since wTi > wTy +wTj
and wTi > w
T
y >
1
4
> wTk + w
T
j , we have that w
T12
i > w
T12
y >
1
4
> wT12j + w
T12
k . If
wT12i >
1
2
, then (wT12 ; p) is dominated by some state in the core such that player i has
the total wealth. If wT12i  12 , then (wT12 ; p) is dominated by some state in the core
at which players i and j have halves. Since (wT12 ; p0) 2 T12(wT ; p0) is arbitrary, we
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have that T12(wT ; p0) \ S = ?.
Therefore, (wT ; p) =2 S cannot be dominated by any state in S. This contradiction
shows that there is no stable set in the four-player and two-region model.
Theorem 28 generalizes Proposition 27 to a I player and N region model where
I = 4 and N = 2, or I  4 and N  3.
Theorem 28 No stable set exists in a I player and N region model where I = 4
and N = 2, or I  4 and N  3.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a stable set S. For any four
distinct players i, j, k, and y, dene the set F (i; j; k; y) of states by F (i; j; k; y) =
f(w; p) : wi + wj + wk + wy = 1, p1 [ p2 = fi; j; k; yg, and p3 = I n fi; j; k; yg if
N  3g. Then any state in F (i; j; k; y) cannot be dominated by another state in
X nF (i; j; k; y). Thus S \F (i; j; k; y) is externally stable with respect to F (i; j; k; y).
Obviously S \ F (i; j; k; y) is internally stable. Therefore, S \ F (i; j; k; y) is both
internal stable and external stable with respect to F (i; j; k; y). It is easily seen that
S \ F (i; j; k; y) of states can be adapted for a stable set in the four-player and two-
region model. This contradicts Proposition 27, which shows nonexistence of stable
set in the four-player and two-region model. This contradiction completes the proof.
3 Core in expectation
As has been shown in section 2, stable set is not appropriate for a solution to the
spatial pillage game. In a I player and N region model where I = 4 and N = 2,
or I  4 and N  3, no stable set exists. In three-player models, there exist stable
sets. However, they contain implausible states, such as some states in the set of
states X#I = f(w; p) : for some play i, 1 > wi > 12g. Every state in X#I is naturally
thought not to be stationary because one of the players has enough power to pillage
the others, so the player would achieve all of the wealth.
These problems with the solution concept of stable set are caused by weakness
of external stability, which requires that any state outside a stable set be directly
dominated by some state in the stable set. Some states in X#I are directly dominated
only by other states in X#I , thus a stable set must contain some states in X#I to
satisfy external stability. This shows why stable sets in three-player models contain
some states in X#I . In I player and N region models where I = 4 and N = 2, or
I  4 and N  3, if an internally stable set S 0 includes a set of states that dominates
every state in X#I n S 0, then there exists some state (w; p) =2 S 0 that S 0 cannot
dominate. It is because the internally stable set S 0 inevitably dominates every state
that dominates (w; p). This shows why no stable set exists in these models.
Jordan (2005) introduced the solution concept of farsighted core of consistent
expectation that is based on the concept of dominance in expectation. We can
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settle the problem with the solution concept of stable set by adopting the solution
concept of farsighted core, as shown in Theorem 33 and Lemma 34. Theorem 33
assures that a farsighted core of a consistent expectation exists. Lemma 34 guarantees
that a farsighted core of a consistent expectation does not contains any state in X#I .
Note that the denitions of expectation and dominance in expectation are adapted
for a spatial pillage game.
An expectation is a belief that all players have in common and indicates how
each state proceeds.
Denition 29 An expectation is a function f : X  ! X satisfying, for some
integer k  2, fk = fk 1 where fk = f  fk 1. Let fw(w; p) and fp(w; p) denote the
allocation and the distribution at f(w; p), respectively.
Dominance in Expectation between states indicates the possible state that
the present state can change to provided that players follow the expectation after
a change. Both physical and spatial conditions should be satised in order for a
winning coalition in expectation, who end up being better o¤, to change its present
state through defeating a losing coalition in expectation, who end up being worse o¤.
Physical and spatial conditions are reected on condition iii) and conditions i) and
ii) in Denition 30, respectively.
Denition 30 Let an expectation f satisfy that fk = fk+1. Given states (w; p) and
(w0; p0), dene Wf = fi : fkw(w0; p0)i > wig and Lf = fi : fkw(w0; p0)i < wig. Suppose
that for some r 2 R, i) fi : w0i 6= wig  p0r; ii) for all q 6= r, p0q = pq n (Wf \ p0r); and
iii)
P
i2Wf\p0r wi >
P
i2Lf\p0r wi. Then (w
0; p0) dominates (w; p) in expectation.
An expectation is consistent if it is organized in accord with the relation of dom-
inance in expectation. If a state (w; p) proceeds to another state (w0; p0) in expecta-
tion, then (w0; p0) dominates (w; p) in expectation. If a state (w00; p00) is stationary in
expectation, then no state dominates (w00; p00) in expectation.
Denition 31 An expectation f is consistent if f(w; p) dominates (w; p) in expec-
tation when f(w; p) 6= (w; p) and (w; p) is undominated in expectation when f(w; p) =
(w; p).
Farsighted core and farsighted supercore1 are dened as follows.
Denition 32 Given an expectation f , the farsighted core under the expectation
f is the set of states Kf = f(w; p) 2 X : under the expectation f , no state in X
dominates (w; p) in expectationg. The farsighted supercore CS is the intersection
of all farsighted cores of consistent expectations.
1Farsighted supercore is named after Roths (1976) supercore.
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Theorem 33 assures that there exists a consistent expectation that has the set D
of states as farsighted core.
Theorem 33 (Existence of a consistent expectation) There exists a consistent
expectation f such that Kf = D.
Proof. Let X = f(w; p) 2 X : for each region r 2 R, Pi2pr wi = 0; 12 ; or 1 and for
some region q 2 R, ifPi2pq wi = 12 , then for some player z, wz = 12g. Then by Lemma
19, D is the unique set that satises both internal stability and external stability with
respect to X. Therefore, it su¢ ces to construct a consistent expectation f such that
for some positive integer k, fk(X n X)  D.
For any positive integer n  2, dene Xn = f(w; p) : there exist n distinct regions
r1; :::; rn such that i)
P
i2pr1[[prn wi = 1; ii)
P
i2pr1 wi = maxr02Rf
P
i2pr0 wig >P
i2prn wi > 0; and iii) for each j 2 pr1 and some nonnegative integer kj, wj =
(
P
z2pr1 wz) (12)kjg. Then any state in X2 is dominated by some state in D through
players in a wealthier region pillaging other players in another region. Therefore, we
construct f such that every state in X2 is dominated in expectation by some state
in D. Similarly, we can construct f such that for any integer k  2, any state in
Xk+1 nXk is dominated in expectation by some state in Xk. Note that for any state
(w; p) 2 Xn, if fw(w; p)i > wi, then for any positive integer k, fkw(w; p)i  fw(w; p)i
and that during the change from (w; p) to fn 1(w; p), pillage happens in each region
at most once.
Now, we design the expectation f to satisfy that any state in X n (X#R [ X)
is dominated in expectation by some state in X#R. For some regions q and q0, let
(w; p) 2 X nX#R satisfy thatPi2pq wi >Pi2pq0 wi > 0. Then we have that (w; p) =2
X. Since (w; p) =2 X#R, there exist region r and player i such that i 2 pr,Pz2pr wz =
maxr02Rf
P
z2pr0 wzg, and for any nonnegative integer ki, wi 6= (
P
z2pr wz)  (12)ki.
Theorem 18 assures that there exists the state (w0; p) 2 X#R such that i) w0i = wi
when i =2 pr; ii) for some nonnegative integer ki, w0i = (
P
z2pr wz) (12)ki when i 2 pr;
and iii)
P
z2fy:w0y>wygwz >
P
z2fy:w0y<wygwz. Then (w
0; p) 2 X#R dominates (w; p),
and thus we can make (w0; p) dominate (w; p) in expectation.
Let ( _w; p) 2 X n X satisfy that for any two regions r and q, if Pi2pr _wi > 0 andP
i2pq _wi > 0, then
P
i2pr _wi =
P
i2pq _wi. Note that ( _w; p) =2 X#R. For some distinct
regions r and q, if
P
i2pr _wi =
P
i2pq _wi =
1
2
and _w is dyadic, then since ( _w; p) =2 X,
for each i, _wi < 12 . In this case, a coalition E such that
P
i2E _wi =
1
2
, pr * E (or
pq * E), and E  fi : wi > 0g can pillage all players in one of the regions and divide
their booty in proportion to their wealth. For each region r, if
P
i2pr _wi = 0 or
1
2
and there exists player i such that for any nonnegative integer ki, _wi 6= (12)ki, then
by Theorem 18, there exists an allocation _w0 such that i) when z =2 ppi, _w0z = _wz; ii)
when z 2 ppi, for some nonnegative integer kz, _w0z = (
P
y2ppi _wy)  (12)kz ; and iii)P
z2fy: _w0y> _wyg _wz >
P
z2fy: _w0y< _wyg _wz. Then a coalition
_E that consists of fz : _w0z > _wzg
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and player j such that pj 6= pi and _wj > 0 can pillage the other players at region
pi and proportion their wealth to _w0 while giving 12(
1
2
+ _wj) to player j. Note that
players in the coalition _E who earn nothing or even lose their wealth at ( _w0; p0)
participate in _E because they expect that their wealth will increase in the future
movement. Similarly, in case that for each region r,
P
i2pr _wi <
1
2
, we can construct
f so that ( _w; p) is dominated in expectation by some state in X#R. Note that for
any (w; p) 2 X n (X#R [ X), if fw(w; p)i > wi, then for any positive integer k,
fkw(w; p)i  fw(w; p)i and that during the change from (w; p) to f#R(w; p), pillage
happens in each region at most once.
Now, we only need to check if the expectation f is consistent. The expectation
f satises that i) for any (w; p) 2 X, if fw(w; p)i > wi, then for any positive in-
teger k, fkw(w; p)i  fw(w; p)i; and ii) during the change from (w; p) to f#R(w; p),
pillage can happen in each region at most once. If a player experiences pillage in
his region, then he will never be pillaged during the rest of the process of f ; that
is, for any (w; p) 2 X n Kf and any i 2 I, if pi satises that fz : fw(w; p)z 6=
wzg  ppi, then any positive integer k, fkw(w; p)i  fw(w; p)i. It is easily seen
that for any state (w; p) 2 X and any positive integer k, if fk(w; p) 6= fk 1(w; p),
then i) there exists a region r 2 R such that fz : fkw(w; p)z 6= fk 1w (w; p)zg 
fkp (w; p)
r; ii) for all q 6= r, fkp (w; p)q = fk 1p (w; p)q n fz : fkw(w; p)z > fk 1w (w; p)zg;
and iii)
P
y2fz:fkw(w;p)z>fk 1w (w;p)zg f
k 1
w (w; p)y >
P
y2fz:fkw(w;p)z>fk 1w (w;p)zg f
k 1
w (w; p)y.
These show that f(w; p) dominates (w; p) in expectation when f(w; p) 6= (w; p) and
(w; p) is undominated in expectation when f(w; p) = (w; p). Therefore, f is consis-
tent.
The expectation f constructed above shows how the neutrality assumption is
modied in a spatial pillage game. If some players expect that they would be pillaged
during the process of f , then they combine their power under spatial restriction to
protect themselves although some of them are not pillaged immediately. For example,
the state ((1
2
; 1
6
; 1
3
); (1; 2; 2)) is not dominated in expectation by ((2
3
; 0; 1
3
); (2; 2; 2))
because player 3 will be against player 1 to protect player 2 in the expectation that
after player 1 pillaging player 2, player 1 would pillage player 3. This shows that
neutrality is modied. However, ((1
2
; 1
6
; 1
3
); (1; 2; 2)) is dominated in expectation by
((1
2
; 0; 1
2
); (1; 2; 2)) because player 1 keeps neutral. Also, the state ((1
2
; 1
6
; 1
3
); (1; 1; 2)) is
dominated in expectation by ((2
3
; 0; 1
3
); (1; 1; 2)) because player 3 cannot protect player
2 because of spatial restriction. In these cases, neutrality is not modied. Therefore,
as Jordan (2005) said, "the concept of domination in expectation constitutes an
endogenous modication of the neutrality assumption" in a spatial pillage game.
Lemma 34 shows that in a consistent expectation, if one of players has a majority
of the wealth, then the player would nally have all of the wealth. Lemmas 34 and
35 are used to prove Proposition 36.
Lemma 34 Let the set of states X#I = f(w; p) : for some play i, 1 > wi > 12g and
the set of states D0 = f(w; p) : for each i, wi = 0 or 1g. Then for any consistent
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expectation f , there exists a positive integer k such that fk(X#I) = D0.
Proof. For any integer n  2, dene Xn = f(w; p) : there exist n distinct players
i1; :::; in such that 1 > wi1 >
1
2
and wi1 +    + win = 1g. Let f be a consistent
expectation such that fk = fk+1. Then we have that X2 \ Kf = ? because every
state in X2 is dominated in expectation by some state in D0  Kf . Suppose that for
some integer n  2, Xn \Kf = ?, then we can show that Xn+1 \Kf = ?. For two
distinct players i and j, let (w0; p0) 2 Xn+1 and (w; p) satisfy that w0i > 12 , w0j > 0,
wi = w
0
i + w
0
j, wz = w
0
z and pz = p
0
z for each z =2 fi; jg, and pi = pj = p0j. Then the
state (w; p) is in Xn, and thus Kf does not contain (w; p). Since wi > 12 , f
k(w; p)
satises that fkw(w; p)i  wi. Otherwise any change in (w; p) is not possible. Since
wi > w
0
i, the state (w; p) dominates (w
0; p0) in expectation, and soKf does not contain
(w0; p0). Since (w0; p0) is arbitrary, we have that Xn+1 \ Kf = ?. Consequently, we
have that X#I \Kf = ?. It is easily seen that if (w00; p00) 2 X#I and w00i > 12 , then
fkw(w
00; p00)i  w00i . Therefore, we have that fk(X#I) = D0.
Lemma 35 (Lemma 3.10 in Jordan, 1999) For some positive integer k, let w be
a dyadic allocation such that for each i, if wi > 0 then wi  2 (k+1). If an allocation w0
satises that
P
z2fi:w0i>wigwz >
P
z2fi:w0i<wigwz, then there exists a dyadic allocation
w00 such that
P
z2fi:w00i >w0igw
0
z >
P
z2fi:w00i <w0igw
0
z and for each i, if w
00
i > 0 then w
00
i 
2k.
Proposition 36 shows that every farsighted core of a consistent expectation in-
cludes the set D of dyadic states at which one of players has a half of the wealth or
the total wealth.
Proposition 36 Let D = f(w; p) 2 D : there exists player i with wi = 1 or 12g.
Then the farsighted supercore Cs includes D.
Proof. 2For any player i, dene the setX(i) of states byX(i) = f(w; p) 2 X : wi = 12
and for some region r,
P
z2prnfigwz =
1
2
g. Let f be a consistent expectation with
fk = fk+1. We rst show that fk(X(i))  X(i). Let ( _w; _p) 2 X(i). Note that only
a winning coalition in expectation, fz : fkw( _w; _p)z > _wzg, can emigrate to another
region, that is, for some player z, if fkp ( _w; _p)z 6= _pz, then fkw( _w; _p)z > _wz. By way
of contradiction, suppose that fkw( _w; _p)i >
1
2
. Then by Lemma 34, fk( _w; _p)i = 1. In
this case, we have that
P
z2fy:fkw( _w; _p)y> _wyg _wz =
P
z2fy:fkw( _w; _p)y< _wyg _wz. Thus f
k( _w; _p)
cannot dominate ( _w; _p) in expectation because all players in the losing coalition in
expectation, fz : fkw( _w; _p)z < _wzg, are in a common region. Since fkw( _w; _p)i < 12 is
not possible, we must have that fkw( _w; _p)i =
1
2
. If there exists a region r such thatP
z2 _pr f
k
w( _w; _p)z <
1
2
, then fkw( _w; _p) is dominated in expectation by some state in
X#I = f(w; p) : for some play z, 1 > wz > 12g through player i pillaging players at
2The proof of Proposition 36 is similar to the proof of Theorem in Jordan (2005).
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region r. Therefore, for some region r, we have that
P
z2fkp ( _w; _p)rnfig f
k
w( _w; _p)z =
1
2
and
thus that fk( _w; _p) 2 X(i). Since ( _w; _p) 2 X(i) is arbitrary, we have that fk(X(i)) 
X(i).
Next, we show that D  Kf and thus that D  Cs. Suppose by way of
contradiction that D \ X(i) * fk(X(i)). For any nonnegative integer n, dene
Dn = f(w; p) 2 D : for each i, wi = 0 or wi  2 ng. Note that
S
n2NDn = D
. Thus
there exists a positive integer m with m = minfn : Dn \ X(i) * fk(X(i))g. Since
D1  CS, m is greater than 1. Let ( _w; _p) be in (Dm\X(i))nfk(X(i)). Since ( _w; _p) =2
fk(X(i)), we have that ( _w; _p) 6= fk( _w; _p). Since f is consistent and ( _w; _p); fk( _w; _p) 2
X(i), we have that
P
z2fy 6=i:fkw( _w; _p)y> _wyg _wz >
P
z2fy 6=i:fkw( _w; _p)y< _wyg _wz and thus thatP
z2fy 6=i:2fkw( _w; _p)y>2 _wyg 2 _wz >
P
z2fy 6=i:2fkw( _w; _p)y<2 _wyg 2 _wz. Note that the allocation w
that consists of players I n fig such that for each z 6= i, wz = 2 _wz is a dyadic alloca-
tion in (#I   1) player model. Therefore, by Lemma 35, there exists a dyadic allo-
cation _w0 in #I player model such that _w0i = 12 ,
P
z2fy 6=i:2 _w0y>2fkw( _w; _p)yg 2f
k
w( _w; _p)z >P
z2fy 6=i:2 _w0y<2fkw( _w; _p)yg 2f
k
w( _w; _p)z, and for each z, if _w
0
z > 0 then _w
0
z  2 (m 1). Since
fk( _w; _p) 2 X(i), there exists some region r such that Pz2fkp ( _w; _p)rnfig fkw( _w; _p)z = 12 .
Let the distribution _p0 satisfy that for each z, if _w0z 6= fkw( _w; _p)z then _p0z = r, otherwise
_p0z = f
k
p ( _w; _p)z. If ( _w
0; _p0) 2 fk(X(i)), then ( _w0; _p0) dominates fk( _w; _p) in expectation.
Therefore, we have that ( _w0; _p0) =2 fk(X(i)) and ( _w0; _p0) 2 Dm 1 \X(i). This contra-
dicts the denition ofm. Consequently, we have that for each i, D\X(i)  fk(X(i)).
Since D0 = (D nX(i))  Kf , we have that D  Kf . Since f is an arbitrary consis-
tent expectation, we have that D  Cs.
Theorem 37 shows thatD is the unique farsighted core in a I player andN region
model where 1  I  3 or N = 1. Note that Jordan (2005) used one-step expecta-
tion, where every state reaches its stationary state within one step, and had the same
result as Theorem 37 in one-region models. Therefore, the denition of expectation
in Jordan (2005) can be generalized to nite-step expectation, where some states take
nite steps, possibly more than one step, to reach their stationary states.
Theorem 37 In a I player and N region model where 1  I  3 or N = 1, D is
the unique farsighted core of consistent expectations, and thus the farsighted supercore
is D.
Proof. By Theorem 33, D is a farsighted core of some consistent expectation. To
show uniqueness, we assume that f is a consistent expectation. We rst prove
that D = Kf in one-region models. For any state (w; p) =2 Kf , we have thatP
z2fi:fkw(w;p)i>wigwz >
P
z2fi:fkw(w;p)i<wigwz. For any states (w
0; p0); (w00; p00) 2 Kf ,
we have that
P
z2fi:w00i >w0igw
0
z 
P
z2fi:w00i <w0igw
0
z. Therefore, Kf satises external
stability and internal stability, that is, Kf is a stable set. Theorem 18 implies that
Kf = D.
Let 1  I  3. Then for any (w; p) 2 D, there exists player i with wi = 1 or 12 .
Thus we have that (w; p) 2 D = f(w; p) 2 D : there exists player i with wi = 1 or
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1
2
g. By Lemma 34, we have that D = D  Cs  Kf . To show that Kf  D, let
(w; p) =2 D. If for some player i, wi > 12 , then by Lemma 34, fk(w; p) 2 D0  D, and
thus (w; p) =2 Kf . If for each player i, wi  12 , then (w; p) is dominated in expectation
by some state in D  Kf such that two players have halves through two players
or one player pillaging another player. Thus we have that (w; p) =2 Kf since f is
consistent. Therefore, we have that Kf = D.
Since f is an arbitrary consistent expectation, D is the unique farsighted core.
Therefore, the farsighted supercore is D in a I player and N region model where
1  I  3 or N = 1.
Example 38 provides a consistent expectation f with D * Kf and Kf * D, that
is, a farsighted core of a consistent expectation might contain nondyadic states and
rule out dyadic states. Therefore, Example 38 shows that Theorem 37 cannot be
generalized.
Example 38 In the ve-player three-region model, there exists a consistent expec-
tation f such that for some " 2 (0; 1
12
), Kf = D [ f((14 + "; 14 + "; 14 + "; 0; 14  
3"); (1; 1; 2; 1; 3))g nf((1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
; 0); (1; 1; 1; 1; 2))g.
Proof. Let (w0; p0) = ((1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
; 0); (1; 1; 1; 1; 2)). First, construct f such that (w0; p0)
 ! f(w0; p0) = ((3"; 1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
; 1
4
  3"); (3; 1; 1; 1; 3))  ! f 2(w0; p0) = ((2"; 1
4
; 1
4
+ "; 1
4
; 1
4
 
3"); (2; 1; 2; 1; 3))  ! f 3(w0; p0) = ((1
4
+ "; 1
4
+ "; 1
4
+ "; 0; 1
4
  3"); (1; 1; 2; 1; 3)). If
f 3(w0; p0) 2 Kf , then for each k 2 f1; 2; 3g, fk(w0; p0) dominates fk 1(w0; p0) in ex-
pectation, and thus we have that (w0; p0) =2 Kf .
Next, we make the expectation f consistent such that f 3(w0; p0) 2 Kf . Note that
only a winning coalition in expectation who would be better o¤ in the farsighted
core can move to other regions. Therefore, it su¢ ces to construct the consistent
expectation f such that some of players who change their region at f 3(w0; p0) wind
up being worse o¤ at the nal state in Kf .
For three distinct players i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g, let X(i; 5) = f(w; p) : wj = wk = 14+",
pj = f
3
p (w
0; p0)j, pk = f 3p (w
0; p0)k, pi = p5 = 3, p4 = 3 or 1, and
P
z2p3 wz =
2
4
 
2"g. Construct the expectation f such that every state in X(i; 5) is dominated in
expectation by the state in D at which players j and k have halves. Then we
have made the expectation f such that no state in X(i; 5) dominates f 3(w0; p0) in
expectation because any state that results from only player i changing her region
winds up the state at which player i has zero.
For three distinct players i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g, let X(i; j; 5) = f(w; p) : wk = 14 +
", pk = f 3p (w
0; p0)k, pi = pj = p5 = 3, p4 = 3 or 1, and
P
z2p3 wz =
3
4
  "g. If
(w; p) 2 X(1; 2; 5) satises that for some player z, wz > 12(34   "), then we make
(w; p) dominated in expectation by the state ( _w; p) with _wz = 34   " and _w3 = 14 + ".
Then ( _w; p) is dominated in expectation by some state ( _w0; p0) 2 D with _w0z = 1. If
(w; p) 2 X(1; 2; 5) satises that 1
2
(3
4
  ")  maxfwz : z 6= 3g > 14   ", then we make
(w; p) dominated in expectation by the state in D at which players 3 and minfz :
wz >
1
4
  "g have halves. If (w; p) 2 X(1; 2; 5) satises that maxfwz : z 6= 3g  14   ",
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then we make (w; p) dominated in expectation by the state in D at which player 3
has a half and players z and y such that z; y 6= 3 and wz +wy > 14   " have quarters.
To embody the expectation f , choose players z and y such that 5z+y = minf5l+m :
for two distinct players l;m 6= 3, wl+wm > 14   "g, which is the rst by lexicographic
ordering. Similarly, we construct f such that no state in X(1; 3; 5) or X(2; 3; 5)
dominates f 3(w0; p0) in expectation.
For three distinct players i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g, let X(i; j; k) = f(w; p) : w5 = 14   3",
p5 = 3, pi = pj = pk = f 3p (w
0; p0)k, p4 = 1 or f 3p (w
0; p0)k, and
P
z2pf3p (w0;p0)k wz =
3
4
+3"g.
If (w; p) 2 X(1; 2; 3) satises that for some player z, wz > 12(34 + 3"), then we make
(w; p) dominated in expectation by the state ( _w; _p) with _wz = 34 +3". Then the state
( _w0; _p0) 2 D with _w0z = 1 dominates ( _w; _p) in expectation. If (w; p) 2 X(1; 2; 3)
satises that 1
2
(3
4
+ 3")  maxfwz : z 6= 5g > 14 + 3", then we make (w; p) dominated
in expectation by the state in D at which players 5 and minfz : wz > 14 + 3"g
have halves. If (w; p) 2 X(1; 2; 3) satises that #fz : z 6= 5 and 1
4
+ 3"  wz >
1
4
(3
4
+ 3")g = 3, then we make (w; p) dominated in expectation by the state ( _w; _p)
such that players z and y who satisfy 5z + y = minf5l +m : for two distinct players
l;m 2 f1; 3; 4g, wl +wm > 12(34 + 3")g have 12(34 + 3")s and make ( _w; _p) dominated in
expectation by the state in D such that players z and y have halves. In this case,
one of players 1 and 2 ends up being worse o¤. If (w; p) 2 X(1; 2; 3) satises that
maxfwz : z 6= 5g  14 + 3" and #fz : wz > 14(34 + 3")g  2, then we make (w; p)
dominated in expectation by the state ( _w; _p) such that player i who has the least
number among the wealthiest players at region 2, that is, i = minfz 2 p2 : for any
player y 2 p2, wz  wyg, has 12(34 + 3") and other two players z and y that satisfy
5z+ y = minf5l+m : l;m =2 fi; 5g, l 6= m, and wl; wm  14(34 +3")g have 14(34 +3")s.
Then we make ( _w; _p) dominated in expectation by ( _w0; _p0) in D such that player i
has a half and players z and y have quarters. Similarly, we construct f such that no
state in X(1; 3; 2) or X(2; 3; 1) dominates f 3(w0; p0) in expectation.
Finally, we construct the rest of the expectation f according to the way introduced
in Theorem 33. Then we have that Kf = D [ ff 3(w0; p0)g nf(w0; p0)g, (w0; p0) 2 D,
and f 3(w0; p0) =2 D. Now, we only have to examine if f is consistent.
The expectation f is designed to satisfy that during the process of the expectation
f , pillage can happen in each region at most once. If a player experiences pillage in
his region, then he will never be pillaged during the rest of the process of f ; that
is, for any (w; p) 2 X n Kf and any i 2 I, if pi satises that fz : fw(w; p)z 6=
wzg  ppi, then any positive integer k, fkw(w; p)i  fw(w; p)i. It is easily seen
that for any state (w; p) 2 X and any positive integer k, if fk(w; p) 6= fk 1(w; p),
then i) there exists a region r 2 R such that fz : fkw(w; p)z 6= fk 1w (w; p)zg 
fkp (w; p)
r; ii) for all q 6= r, fkp (w; p)q = fk 1p (w; p)q n fz : fkw(w; p)z > fk 1w (w; p)zg;
and iii)
P
y2fz:fkw(w;p)z>fk 1w (w;p)zg f
k 1
w (w; p)y >
P
y2fz:fkw(w;p)z>fk 1w (w;p)zg f
k 1
w (w; p)y.
These show that f(w; p) dominates (w; p) in expectation when f(w; p) 6= (w; p) and
(w; p) is undominated in expectation when f(w; p) = (w; p). Therefore, f is consis-
tent.
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4 Suggestion for further research
Throughout this paper, we have assumed that regions are connected with one another
and thus players can travel from one region to another in one move. The results based
on this assumption are meaningful in that they give general understanding of how
spatial restriction a¤ects stable distribution of wealth. Also, for applications, when we
consider that many countries, which could be regarded as regions, are surrounded by
the sea and we can travel from one country to another through the sea, the assumption
seems to be an approximation to reality.
However, in order to describe real situations more exactly, we can generate a
general model where some regions are not connected and thus players cannot travel
between these regions in one move. A geography correspondence G embodies the
general models as follows.
Denition 39 A geography correspondence is a correspondence G : R  ! ! R
satisfying for any r 2 R, i) r 2 G(r); ii) if r0 2 G(r) then r 2 G(r0); and iii) there
exists a positive integer k such that Gk(r) = R where Gk(r) = Gk 1(G(r)).
For any r 2 R, G(r) denotes the regions that players at region r can go to in one
move. Condition i) means that players can stay in their regions. Condition ii) means
that connections between two regions are bilateral. And condition iii) means that
there is no separated region where players cannot travel. For example, we can dene
G as G(1) = f1; 2g, G(2) = f1; 2; 3g, and G(3) = f2; 3g, then G describes that three
regions are located along a line.
The general model characterized by a geography correspondence is di¤erent from
the previous model presented above in terms that weak players may be able to change
states to defend themselves and thus some coalitions may not pillage less powerful
coalitions. The following example shows how it works. Suppose that there are three
players and ve regions. Let G describe that ve regions are located along a line,
that is, G(1) = f1; 2g; G(2) = f1; 2; 3g; :::; and G(5) = f4; 5g. Consider the state
(w; p) = ((4
9
; 1
9
; 4
9
); (1; 3; 5)), which expresses that players 1 and 3 have 4
9
s while staying
at region 1 and at region 5, respectively, and player 2 has 1
9
while staying at region 3.
At the state (w; p), player 2 can change the state to discourage another player who
tried to pillage player 2. In cases that player 1 or players 1 and 3 approach player
2 to pillage, player 2 can move to region 4 to change the state so that player 3 can
pillage player 2 alone. If player 3 alone pillages player 2, then player 3 has enough
power to pillage player 1. Thus player 1 would not try to pillage player 2. In case
that player 3 alone approaches player 2 to pillage, we can apply the same logic.
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